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Abstract
This thesis addresses many of the unique spectrum management chal-
lenges in CR networks for the first time. These challenges have a vital
effect on the network performance and are particularly difficult to solve
due to the unique characteristics of CR networks. Specifically, this thesis
proposes and investigates three intelligent spectrum management tech-
niques for CR networks. The issues investigated in this thesis have a
fundamental impact on the establishment, functionality and security of
CR networks.
First, an intelligent primary receiver-aware message exchange protocol
for CR ad hoc networks is proposed. It considers the problem of alleviat-
ing the interference collision risk to primary user communication, explic-
itly to protect primary receivers that are not detected during spectrum
sensing. The proposed protocol achieves a higher measure of safeguard-
ing. A practical scenario is considered where no global network topology
is known and no common control channel is assumed to exist.
Second, a novel CR broadcast protocol (CRBP) to reliably disseminate
the broadcast messages to all or most of the possible CR nodes in the
network is proposed. The CRBP formulates the broadcast problem as a
bipartite-graph problem. Thus, CRBP achieves a significant successful
delivery ratio by connecting different local topologies, which is a unique
feature in CR ad hoc networks.
Finally, a new defence strategy to defend against spectrum sensing data
falsification attacks in CR networks is proposed. In order to identify
malicious users, the proposed scheme performs multiple verifications of
sensory data with the assistance of trusted nodes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The demand for wireless traffic has been substantially increased in the last decade
due to the proliferation of wireless technology and the globalisation of smart phones,
Internet-based applications and services [1]. However, according to the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), the limited natural spectrum resources do not sat-
isfy the dramatic spectrum demand, as most of the radio spectrum for wireless com-
munications has already been allocated. Recent spectrum measurements reveal that
the allocated spectrum is underutilized by up to 85% [2]. Hence, the FCC highlights
that the current spectrum scarcity problem is explained by inefficient and inflexi-
ble regulations rather than the physical spectrum shortage. In order to overcome
the incompatibility between the spectrum underutilization and the increase in the
wireless spectrum demand, the FCC has suggested a new paradigm for dynamically
accessing the assigned spectrum bands, known as cognitive radio technology.
Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged as a revolutionary technology to deal with the
disparity between the continuously increasing demand for wireless radio spectrum
and the spectrum underutilization by licensed users based on Dynamic Spectrum
Access (DSA) [3]. There are two types of users in the CR networks: 1) licensed user
(usually referred to as primary user (PU)) who can operate in a certain range of
frequencies at any time within a geographical area and 2) unlicensed user (usually
referred to as cognitive radio user (CR)) who can opportunistically use the vacant
licensed spectrum bands assigned to licensed users. Unlike conventional spectrum
policy in which designated parts of the spectrum are allocated specifically for exclu-
sive use to licensed users, CR technology permits unlicensed users to opportunisti-
cally and dynamically take advantage of the licensed spectrum resources that might
1
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be available at a certain time and location [4]. These resources can potentially be
deployed in several bands of different bandwidth. Furthermore, the availability of
this spectrum might dynamically change over time, as the primary users occupy or
free up a given band. However, the operations of any CR user should not affect the
communications of primary users.
1.1 CR Fundamental Functionalities
The idea of CR technology is to enable CR users to opportunistically use the va-
cant licensed spectrum. Therefore, new and essential functionalities are needed to
support this adaptivity in CR networks [5]. The fundamental functionalities for CR
networks can be summarized as follows:
(i) Spectrum sensing: Spectrum sensing technology is considered a fundamental
functionality of Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). CR nodes sense primary
user activity and determine channel availability in order to allow CR users
access to vacant licensed bands in an opportunistic manner [6]. Hence, the
accuracy of this sensory information is very important for cognitive radio net-
work communications. Otherwise, CR traffic may cause interference to the
licensed users.
(ii) Spectrum management: CR users select the best available spectrum band
which meets their communication requirements. The captured spectrum should
not cause negative interference to PUs. Amongst all available spectrum bands,
CR users choose the best spectrum channel to meet the different Quality-of-
Service (QoS) requirements. The spectrum management functions are so im-
portant for the CR network operation [7]. These management functions may
be labelled as: 1) spectrum analysis and 2) spectrum decision.
(iii) Spectrum mobility: CR technology allows CR users to access the licensed
spectrum in a dynamic and opportunistic manner. Therefore, based on the
radio spectrum environment, CR users can change the frequency channel to
operate in the most suitable available channel. The transition to a better
spectrum band should respect the outlined requirements in order to achieve
seamless communication. In addition, CR users should vacate the spectrum
2
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Figure 1.1: A typical cognitive radio cycle
when a licensed user is detected to be active on the same channel. This is a new
and unique feature in CR networks, where CR users determine, identify and
hop to new available spectrum bands in order to continue their transmissions
when the current spectrum band is not available.
(iv) Spectrum sharing: CR nodes need to coordinate access to available channels
in order to fairly share the spectrum through scheduling methods. The main
objective of the spectrum sharing is to improve spectrum efficiency by jointly
allocates the available resources among different CR users.
A typical cognitive cycle that states the major functionalities of CR and is rele-
vant to reconfigurability and capability is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.2 Overview of the Proposed Intelligent Spec-
trum Techniques
In the last decade, several important studies have been carried out in the field of
CR Networks. These works have mainly focused on spectrum sensing and spectrum
sharing [5]. However, spectrum management of CR technology remains underde-
veloped due to a lack of sufficient research efforts. In this research, the design of
intelligent spectrum management techniques for wireless CR networks is investi-
gated. In order to form an operative framework for CR networks, it is essential
to interconnect most of the fundamental CR functionalities (i.e., spectrum sensing,
spectrum sharing, and spectrum decision). Figure 1.2 illustrates the overview of the
3
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proposed intelligent techniques for spectrum management. The issues investigated
in this research have crucial impact on the establishment, functionality, performance
and security of CR networks. They are fundamental for laying the foundations of
CR networks and operating networking protocols for reliable communications in CR
networks.
First of all, we propose a fully-distributed control information exchange protocol
for CR ad hoc networks that makes the following contributions: i) alleviates risk of
collision in PU communications; ii) guarantees protection for PU-receivers and iii)
provides a highly successful broadcast ratio. We consider several practical scenarios
in our design: 1) limited knowledge of the network environment; 2) no common con-
trol channel is assumed to exist and 3) the sets of available channels of neighbouring
CR nodes are not assumed to be the same. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that investigates the design of broadcasting protocol under a PU-receiver
protection scenario for CR ad hoc networks. The main performance metrics for our
proposed protocol are: PU-receivers protection from harmful interference (i.e., the
interference collision risk of CR broadcast packets with PU communications) and
the successful packet delivery ratio (i.e., the average number of packets successfully
delivered in the network).
Furthermore, a distributed reliable Cognitive Radio Broadcast Protocol (CRBP)
for cognitive radio ad hoc networks is proposed that addresses the problems of net-
work connectivity and reliable data dissemination. The proposed protocol focuses
on multi-hop CR ad hoc networks without specific network topology assumptions,
where each user is equipped with a single transceiver and has limited knowledge
of the network environment. A key novelty of the proposed CRBP is the formu-
lation of the broadcast problem from the viewpoint of connecting different local
topologies, which is a unique feature in cognitive radio networks. We map the net-
work topologies and the spectrum observations as a bipartite graph, which allows
the channel selection undertaken at each node to capture the spectrum information
and the environmental topologies of all the neighbouring nodes. In addition, we
believe that the consideration of different topologies in the same neighbourhood,
transmitter-receiver synchronization and the coordination of the broadcast process
without a common channel uniquely distinguishes CRBP from the other works in
the literature.
Finally, a novel security scheme is proposed to fight against Spectrum Sensing
4
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the proposed intelligent techniques for spectrum manage-
ment.
Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks and identify malicious CR users whom report
fraudulent sensing data in CR networks. Multi-levels of defence are used to maintain
an adequate level of protection. First, we employ a secure authentication protocol
between the Fusion Centre (FC) and the collaborative nodes. Second, three tiers of
verification, the unique signature of the node, the cell-mates signatures and the seal
of the trusted nodes have to be checked by the FC to validate the received sensory
data. Finally, an efficient reputation-based fusion scheme is used as a third level of
defence, which enables the FC to select trusted nodes with the objective of ensuring
the reliability of the received sensory information.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the technical background,
broadcasting challenges, spectrum sensing and security threats in CR networks. This
chapter also reviews the related work on broadcasting protocols and security schemes
in CR networks. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we propose, analyse and evaluate three spec-
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trum management techniques for CR networks. In particular, Chapter 3 presents
a distributed control information exchange protocol for CR ad hoc networks. Two
broadcasting schemes, maximize PU protection (MPUP) and maximize CR connec-
tivity (MCRC) are proposed in this chapter. Chapter 4 elaborates the novel design
of a distributed reliable cognitive radio broadcast protocol (CRBP) for cognitive ra-
dio ad hoc networks. The proposed CRBP formulates the broadcast problem from
the viewpoint of connecting different local topologies, which is a unique feature in
cognitive radio networks. Chapter 5 describes a novel defeating scheme based on
multi-layer security and reputation evaluation that can defeat and identify SSDF
attackers trying to inject false sensory information into the central learning engine.
In Chapter 6, we conclude the thesis contributions and discuss future research.
1.4 Research Publications
The outcome of this thesis has resulted in the following publications:
• Y. Al-Mathehaji, S. Boussakta, M. Johnston and H. Fakhrey, “CRBP: A
broadcast protocol for cognitive radio ad hoc networks”, in IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 7540-7545, June 2015.
• Y. Al-Mathehaji, S. Boussakta, M. Johnston and J. Hussein, “Primary receiver-
aware opportunistic broadcasting in cognitive radio ad hoc networks”, in IEEE
Eighth International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks (ICUFN),
pp. 30-35, July 2016.
• Y. Al-Mathehaji, S. Boussakta and M. Johnston, “Reliable broadcast over
cognitive radio networks: a bipartite graph-based algorithm”, Cognitive Ra-
dio, Dr. Tonu Trump (Ed.), InTech, DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.69216, 2017.
Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/books/cognitive-radio/reliable-
broadcast-over-cognitive-radio-networks-a-bipartite-graph-based-algorithm
• Y. Al-Mathehaji, S. Boussakta, M. Johnston and H. Fakhrey, “Defeating SSDF
attacks with trusted nodes assistance in cognitive radio networks”, in IEEE
Sensors Letters, 2017 (Accepted).
• Y. Al-Mathehaji, S. Boussakta, M. Johnston and H. Fakhrey, “Reliable col-
laborative spectrum sensing for cognitive radio networks in malicious environ-
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ments”, submitted for IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and
Networking, 2017.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter discusses the operation of broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks and the
security issues in CR networks. It reviews existing research related to broadcasting
protocols and defending schemes against SSDF attacks.
This chapter is organized as follows. The background on CR networks are first
introduced in Section 2.1. CR Network standards are listed in Section 2.2. The
broadcasting problems in CR ad hoc networks are presented in Section 2.3. The
unique challenges of broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks are reviewed in Section
2.4. The state-of-the-art technologies used in broadcasting are discussed in 2.5.
Local and cooperative spectrum sensing in CR networks are covered in Section 2.6.
The security threats in CR networks are presented in Section 2.7. Current defending
schemes against SSDF attacks are reviewed in Section 2.8. We conclude this chapter
with a summary in Section 2.9.
2.1 Background on CR Networks
In 1999, J. Mitola and G. Maguire invented the term cognitive radio [8]. However,
depending on the focus of research and the applications, people have different under-
standing and expectations of CR. Therefore, there is no definition of CR commonly
accepted [9], [10], [11]. For example, the FCC views CR as a radio that can change
its transmitter parameters based on interactions with the environment in which it
operates. The majority of cognitive radios will probably be SDRs (Software Defined
Radios), but possessing software and being field programmable are not requirements
of a cognitive radio [12]. Other definitions stress the importance of learning capabil-
ity, while some may emphasise the importance of radio flexibility. CR is significantly
8
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important for addressing the spectrum scarcity problem and spectrum conservation.
Since it is able to share the licensed spectrum with the primary users and guarantee
that interference is kept to a minimum, CR may be considered as an environmentally
friendly radio solution [13].
According to the deployment scenario, CR networks can be classified into two
basic types of networks, one is the infrastructure-based CR networks and the second
is the infrastructure-less CR networks. In the infrastructure-based CR networks, all
CR nodes directly communicate with the central network entity, which is responsible
for managing the network operations, for instance, spectrum sensing and spectrum
assignment. On the other hand, in the infrastructure-less CR networks, also known
as CR ad hoc network, no central entity is present. Hence, CR nodes have to rely on
themselves for spectrum sensing, assignment and management. CR networks can be
useful if applied in demanding environments, such as public safety, civil emergencies,
natural disasters and military operations.
2.2 CR Network Standards
The rapid growth of research in the field of CR technology has motivated standard-
isation institutes, such as FCC, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), and Office of Communications (Ofcom) to develop standards for CR net-
works.
• IEEE 802.22: The first complete CR-base standards that support oppor-
tunistical communication in the TV bands is the IEEE 802.22 wireless region
area network (WRAN) [14]. This technology is developed as an infrastructure-
based CR network and initially presumed to work in rural areas or areas suf-
fering from limited communications infrastructure. It is expected to operate
in the TV bands 54-862 MHz with up to 47 channels. These spectrum bands
permit a typical transmission range from 17-30 km with a maximum commu-
nication range of 100 km.
• SCC41: Standards Coordinating Committee 41 (SCC41) (formerly known as
P1900) addresses techniques of dynamic spectrum access [15]. This technology
considers software defined radio as the key enabler for DSA among 3G/4G,
WiFi, and WiMax networks [16].
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• IEEE 802.11af: IEEE 802.11af [17] is a technology developed for oppor-
tunistic utilization of the TV white space (TVWS) portion of the spectrum.
This standard is developed for ad hoc configuration. It is expected to uti-
lize the TV bands 54-790 MHz with a total of 39 channels. In addition, this
standard permits bond/aggregate up to 4 channels and allows a maximum
transmission communication of 5 km.
• CogNeA: CogNeA(Cognitive Networking Alliances) standard is an open in-
dustry alliance that proposes a new wireless communication paradigm for low
power personal/portable application on the TVWS [18]. Philips, HP, Samsung
Electro-Mechanics and ETRI ( Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute) form the board of directors of CogNeA. CogNeA’s promising appli-
cations include: in-home high definition multi-media networking, tele-health,
Internet access for communities, campuses using ad hoc mesh networking, and
home automation and control.
2.3 Broadcasting in CR ad hoc Networks
When a wireless ad hoc network is deployed and before exchanging any control in-
formation, each user initially only acquires its own local network information and
is unaware of other users network information. However, the realization of most
network protocols in the ad hoc network depends on exchanging control information
among neighbouring nodes. This fundamental information is usually sent out as a
network-wide broadcast messages (i.e. messages that are sent out to all users in a
network). Broadcasting is one of the most classical operations in wireless networks,
as well as in distributed CR networks [19]. In CR networks, several specific func-
tionalities such as spectrum sensing, channel assignment and routing information are
achieved through local or global broadcast messages. In addition, some important
data such as alarm signals and emergency messages are also delivered via network
wide broadcasts [20]. In traditional single-channel or multi-channel ad hoc networks,
all nodes follow the rules of a precise wireless standard. Due to uniform channel
availability, broadcast is easily implemented as all nodes can be tuned to a single
common channel. Thus, the source node only needs to transmit over one channel
to let all its neighbouring nodes receive the broadcast message. However, broad-
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casting in cognitive radio ad hoc networks is a much more challenging task. The
complexity emerges from the fact that harmful interference with the transmissions
of primary users must be avoided. Furthermore, different CR users might acquire
different channels at different times depending on their locations and the activity of
primary users. Therefore, the CR source node may have to broadcast the message
using different channels in order to deliver the broadcast message to all neighbours.
Indeed, the successful delivery of the broadcast message to neighbouring nodes in
CR ad hoc networks relies on connecting different local topologies. The broadcast
channel(s) should be carefully selected and dynamically allocated to guarantee the
network operation.
In the literature, numerous works have extensively studied the broadcasting issue
in traditional ad hoc networks, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs), Wireless Mesh
Networks (WMNs), Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) and Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]. All these
schemes assume that the channel availability is uniform for all nodes, hence only
single channel is used for broadcasting. Therefore, extending traditional broadcast
protocols to CR ad hoc networks is not feasible as they cannot guarantee optimal
performance.
2.4 Challenges of Broadcasting in CR ad hoc Net-
works
Designing a reliable broadcast protocol for wireless CR ad hoc networks is a very
challenging task in practical scenarios, where avoiding collisions with primary com-
munications and achieving a high successful broadcast delivery ratio are essential.
In traditional ad hoc networks, all nodes can tune to the same channel due to the
uniformity of channel availability. However, in CR ad hoc networks, the opportunity
of a common channel available for all CR nodes may not exist. In addition, differ-
ent CR users might acquire different channels at different times. This difference in
channel availability leads to unique challenges when considering the performance of
broadcasting protocols under practical scenarios in CR ad hoc networks.
• Most importantly, different from traditional ad hoc networks, single-hop broad-
casting in CR ad hoc networks is not always successful in an error-free envi-
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ronment. This is because in traditional ad hoc networks, when the source node
transmits the broadcast message, all its single-hop neighbouring nodes receive
the broadcast message when they tune to the same channel. However, the
availability of a common channel for all neighbouring nodes in CR ad hoc net-
works may not exist [31], [32], [33], [34], [35]. Correspondingly, the broadcast
operation may fail. Furthermore, even if a common channel is available, the
source CR node and its neighbours may not be able to tune to the common
channel at the same time, which will also result in an unsuccessful broadcast.
• Secondly, in traditional ad hoc networks, the respective locations of a pair
of nodes do not have an effect on the successful delivery of the broadcast
message as long as they are within the communication range of each other.
However, in CR ad hoc networks, the successful delivery of a broadcast message
is influenced by the sender and the receiver’s corresponding locations. This
is because the channels availability of a CR node is acquired based on the
sensing measurements in its vicinity. Accordingly, CR nodes that are in the
same proximity have a similar set of available channels and they may have
better delivery ratio, compared to CR nodes that are far away from each other
as their available channels are usually less similar.
• Furthermore, in the case of CR ad hoc networks, where no centralized entity
is presented, broadcasting is much complicated, due to CR nodes have to
locally analyse the collected information to select the best available channel
for data dissemination. Intelligent channel selection may lead to higher data
dissemination reachability. In addition, considering PU activity during channel
selection can reduce the successful delivery ratio of the broadcast messages.
• Finally, in traditional ad hoc networks, the single-hop broadcast delay is often
one time slot in an error-free environment. As the source node only requires
one time slot to deliver the broadcast message to all its neighbouring nodes.
On the other hand, in CR ad hoc networks, it is always more than one time slot.
This is due to the variance in the channel availability at different times and
different locations. Therefore, the source node may have to broadcast over
multiple channels, hence it may need more than one time slot to finish the
broadcasting. The number of neighbouring nodes and the channel availability
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are considered as the main factors that influence the single-hop broadcast delay
in CR ad hoc networks.
2.5 Existing Broadcast Protocols in CR ad hoc
Networks
In the last decade, several important studies have been carried out in the field of
CR networks. These works have mainly focused on infrastructure-based networks
that rely on the existence of a centralized coordinator [36]. In these single-hop ar-
chitectures, each CR node directly communicates with the central entity as the end
destination. Furthermore, this entity is responsible for managing the network opera-
tions for all CR users within its coverage, like spectrum sensing, channel assignment,
etc. Recently, CR ad hoc networks have attracted considerable research attention
due to several open challenges [5]. However, the application of CR technology in
distributed scenarios is still in its infancy. In the literature, there are certain papers
that address the issue of broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks that operate in mul-
tichannel environments [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43] [27], [28], [33], [44]. These
works are designed to achieve different performance goals, for instance, optimiza-
tion of throughput, data delivery, delay, etc. However, most of these papers adopt
impractical assumptions which make them unrealistic for use in practical scenarios.
Related work on broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks currently falls into two
categories: (i) works that have been undertaken for general CR ad hoc networks
and (ii) works that have been undertaken for CR ad hoc networks with specific
assumptions, as follows:
2.5.1 General CR ad hoc Networks
Recently, many solutions have been proposed for exchanging the control messages
in CR networks. One of these solutions is to use unlicensed bands such as ISM
(Industrial, Scientific and Medical) or UWB (Ultra-Wideband) for carrying these
messages [45]. The reliability cannot be guaranteed in this case due to the fact
that these unlicensed bands are already shared among various wireless devices that
can operate in the same radio frequency, which may lead to harmful interference
and result in significant performance degradation. One of the simplest solutions
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to enable broadcasting in multichannel networks is the use of a dedicated control
channel [46, 47] usually called Common Control Channel (CCC). In this case, all
the CR users must switch to the CCC in order to transmit or receive broadcast
messages. However, due to the lack of availability of a constant idle channel, this
approach is not feasible in CR networks. A collaborative message dissemination
is proposed in [44]. Instead of the source node transmitting the message to every
channel, neighbours will collaborate in the message dissemination. Upon receiving
the broadcast message, each node will transmit the received message randomly on
one of the available channels. Due to the random nature of channel selection, the
performance of this mechanism cannot be guaranteed.
Different schemes have been proposed for local establishing a CCC [48], [49],
[50], [41]. Since these channels can be used to exchange control information mes-
sages in CR ad hoc networks, the proposed schemes could also be considered as
broadcasting protocols. However, these proposals need prior information about the
channel availability of all the CR nodes. Moreover, there are some proposals on
channel hopping that can be used to find a CCC between CR nodes [42], [51], [52].
However, these schemes suffer from various limitations and cannot guarantee reli-
able broadcasting. For instance, the CR nodes need to obey robust channel hopping
sequences in order to guarantee both CR sender and receiver hopping within a fi-
nite time on the same channel. In [42], CR users hop across the channels according
to a random channel-hopping sequence for packet broadcasting. However, this ap-
proach cannot guarantee successful broadcasting even if they have common available
channels. Furthermore, it works only when two CR nodes have the same number
of available channels. Therefore, these channel hopping schemes [42], [51] are of
limited value for practical broadcast scenarios where the channel availability of CR
nodes in CR ad hoc networks is usually non-uniform. The channel hopping algo-
rithm proposed in [53] requests tight time synchronization. This scheme is also not
feasible without exchanging the control information. A Quality-of-Service (QoS)-
based broadcast scheme under blind information is proposed in [54]. The proposed
approaches in [43] assume that the CRs should have time-synchronization and sym-
metric spectrum to operate. Two data dissemination protocols are proposed in [55]
for multi-channel wireless networks. The first protocol aims to reduce the amount
of time to propagate large data across the network. While the second protocol de-
signed to locally disseminate information in the cluster. In [56], the authors studied
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the issue of broadcasting on multiple access channels using deterministic distributed
protocols. A packet latency comparison of deterministic protocols and back-off ran-
domized protocols is provided in this work. The authors in [57] proposed a strategy
to broadcast in the presence of adversaries for multi-channel wireless networks. They
derived the ideal number of channels that have to be accessed by nodes in order to
minimize the reception delay. In addition, they used network coding to reduce the
impact of attackers on the performance of data dissemination. A power-saving data
dissemination model for mobile units is proposed in [58]. The proposed technique is
suitable for any dissemination-based architectural model in multi-channel environ-
ments. The proposed scheduling algorithm in [59] calculates the average expected
delay of multiple channels while considering access frequency, variable length and
bandwidth of each channel. The strategy proposed in [37] classifies the channels
on the basis of PR unoccupancy and CR occupancy, then selects the best channel
for transmission. The non-uniform channel availability makes it hard to use a sin-
gle channel for CRNs to broadcast. Broadcasting using multiple transceivers has
been proposed as an alternative solution [38], where each CR node should have a
number of transceivers equal to the number of channels. The utilization of multi-
ple transceivers increases the complexity and the operational cost of the CR device
which makes this choice undesirable. In [60], the authors investigated latency, speed
and limits of the data dissemination in mobile CR networks. In [61], the perfor-
mance limits of data dissemination in multi-channels single radio is analysed under
random packet loss. The authors proved that, for any arbitrary topology, the prob-
lem of minimizing the expected delay of data dissemination can be formulated as a
stochastic shortest path problem. However, it is likely that the number of available
channels is not fixed, which leads to variable communication links.
2.5.2 CR ad hoc Networks with Specific Assumptions
Several existing works assume knowledge of the global network topology and the
spectrum availability information at each node [62, 63]. Based on this information,
the authors in [62] propose a time-efficient broadcast algorithm that selects a set of
nodes and channels to transmit a message from the source node to all other nodes
in a multi-hop CR network. A simple heuristic solution to broadcast the messages
in multi-hop cognitive radio networks is proposed in [63], where CR nodes need
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to be either equipped with multiple radios or use a single transceiver to transmit
over multiple channels. In the second case, neighbours require a synchronization
mechanism in order to successfully exchange control information. Additionally, a
dedicated control channel for the whole network is employed in [39], which is not
feasible in CR networks. In [64], the authors propose a unified channel allocation
to handle both unicast and broadcast traffic. The channels are weighted according
to their relative interference and connectivity parameters depending on the propor-
tions of broadcast and unicast traffic in the network. Chraiti et al. [65], propose a
secondary broadcast network composed of one multi-antenna secondary transmitter
(ST) and a set of single-antenna secondary receivers (SRs). The ST is responsible
for broadcasting the data to all the SRs in the presence of primary communication.
By using orthogonal beamforming techniques, the secondary network is allowed to
access the spectrum without affecting the primary transmission.
Most of the aforementioned studies consider impractical scenarios in their de-
sign where global network topology is known, predefined CCC is assumed to be in
existence, information about available channels of all CR nodes are assumed to be
known and multiple transceivers are used. In addition, in all the aforementioned
papers, the CR users select the channel with the least PU activity for its communi-
cation. However, this approach only guarantees protection to the PU-transmitters.
The probable harmful interference that may affect the PU-receivers within the trans-
mission range of the CR devices is not accounted for in these approaches. This can
seriously undermine the performance of PU communication. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no existing broadcast protocol for CR ad hoc networks that
considers these limitations.
In this research, we therefore propose two broadcasting protocols for CR ad hoc
networks by considering the assumptions and limitations of works in the related
literature. They are:
1) a primary receiver-aware opportunistic broadcasting protocol that makes the
following contributions: i) alleviates the interference collision risk to PU com-
munications; ii) guarantees protection to the PU-receivers and iii) provides
a high successful broadcast ratio. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that considers the broadcasting challenges specifically in CR ad hoc
networks under a PU-receiver protection scenario.
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2) a distributed reliable broadcast protocol (CRBP) for cognitive radio ad hoc
networks that addresses the problems of network connectivity, reliable data
dissemination over multi-hops and the issue of securing PR communications.
A key novelty of the proposed CRBP is the formulation of the broadcast
problem from the viewpoint of connecting different local topologies, which is
a unique feature in cognitive radio networks.
Unlike the limitations of related work in the literature, we consider practical sce-
narios in our design where limited knowledge of the network environment is assumed
to be known, no CCC is assumed to exist and the sets of the available channels of
neighbouring CR nodes are not assumed to be the same.
2.6 Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing technology is considered as a fundamental functionality of CR net-
works. CR nodes sense primary user activity and determine the channel availability
in order to access the vacant licensed bands in an opportunistic manner [6]. Hence,
the accuracy of this sensory information is very important for CR communications.
Otherwise, CR traffic may cause interference to the licensed users. Spectrum sensing
techniques can be classified into two types: local spectrum sensing and collaborative
spectrum sensing (CSS). Next, an overview of both sensing techniques is provided.
2.6.1 Local Spectrum Sensing
The existing local spectrum sensing techniques include energy detection, cyclosta-
tionary feature detection and matched filter detection.
• Energy Detection: The energy detection is considered as the simplest tech-
nique for local spectrum sensing. In this sensing technique, an energy de-
tector is used to infer the existence of a PU on a specific channel based on
the measured energy level. In order to measure the energy level accurately,
first a bandpass filter processes the received signal, then the processed signal
is passed to the integrator which squares and integrates the measured signal
over the observation time interval. Finally, a predefined threshold is compared
with the output signal to decide whether a PU is being active or not on the
corresponding band. Based on the channel conditions, the threshold value is
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set to be fixed or variable [66]. The energy detector technique is optimal when
a CR receiver does not have enough information about PU’s signal, such as the
the power of the Gaussian noise and the characteristics of the PU’ signal [67].
Furthermore, the energy detection is the most popular spectrum sensing tech-
nique because it requires no priori information about the PU signal [68], [69].
• Matched Filter Detection: The matched filter technique requires prior in-
formation about the PU signals to reliably detect spectrum holes. The required
PU information includes modulation type, preambles, pulse shape, synchro-
nization codes, etc. The matched filter is a linear filter designed to maximize
the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in stationary Gaussian noise. Hence,
it is considered as the best detector in this case [13], [70]. There are some
advantages of the matched filter over the energy detector. For instance, fewer
samples are required compared to the energy detector, consequently it needs
less detection time. In addition, different signal types in the spectrum band
can be distinguished in this technique. In contrast, the performance of the
match filter technique mainly depends on the accuracy of the prior knowledge
about the PU signal, which is considered a disadvantage of this technique [70].
• Cyclostationary Feature Detection: The cyclostationary feature tech-
nique detects PU signals by utilizing the cyclic feature of these signals. For
instance, both the cyclic spectrum density (CSD) and the cyclic autocorrela-
tion function (CAF) can be used to detect the features of PU signals [71], [66].
The main advantages of the cyclostationary feature technique are its capabil-
ity to identify different types of signals in the spectrum band and its ability
to detect PU signals in the case of a stationary noise with unknown vari-
ance [72]. On the other hand, the complex computation and the required long
observation interval are considered the main disadvantages of this detection
technique [71].
2.6.2 Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing that is individually performed by a single CR user based on lo-
cal sensing information might lead to poor sensing measurements due to several
reasons (e.g., potential signal degradation, hidden terminal problems, energy level
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constraints, etc.) [73] [74]. Collaborative Spectrum sensing (CSS) overcomes these
destructive effects by exploiting multiple CR nodes spatial diversity which results
in enhancing the performance of the sensing operation. Consequently, most of the
existing standards and proposals (i.e., IEEE 802.22, IEEE 802.11af and CogNeA)
have adopted collaborative spectrum sensing [75], [76], [18]. In CSS, each CR user
is represented as a sensing workstation that conveys local sensing. The local mea-
surements are collected by the fusion centre (or data collector), which determines
the final decisions regarding spectrum band availability [77]. CSS can be classi-
fied into two main categories: centralized coordinated technique and decentralized
coordinated technique.
• Centralized Coordinated Technique: In an infrastructure-based CR net-
work, CSS can be carried out in a straightforward way: the CR users serve as
sensing stations while the base station acts as the data collector. In this tech-
nique, once a sensing terminal detects the presence of a PU on the spectrum
band, it informs the central entity which can be a single-hop or multi-hop
distance. Then, using a broadcast control message, the Fusion Centre (FC)
notifies all the CR users about the unavailability of the corresponding band.
• Decentralized Coordinated Technique: In CR ad hoc networks, due to
the absence of a central administrator, CR nodes cooperate to organize the net-
work’s functionalities. In such network deployment, each CR node is equipped
with a CR engine, which enables the CR node to serve simultaneously as a fu-
sion centre and a sensing terminal. Neighbouring CR nodes usually exchange
their local sensing results in this type of collaborative sensing. Based on the
local sensing measurements received from other neighbours, each CR user de-
termines the final spectrum sensing measurements [78]. Different algorithms
have been used to improve the decentralized sensing technique. For exam-
ple, clustering protocols [79] and gossiping schemes [80] are proposed for CR
ad hoc networks to enable CR users to gather clusters and auto coordinate
themselves.
Although collaborative sensing alleviates channel fading problems and consumes
less resources at individual CR nodes, its application faces several challenges. The
presence of attackers may considerably degrade its performance, leading to harmful
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interference with the PU communications and/or a significant loss of the free spec-
trum. Therefore, robust and reliable collaborative sensing is critical in cognitive
radio networks and justifies its place in current empirical research.
2.7 Security Threats in CR Networks
Recent literature identifies several CR approaches, for example, spectrum sensing,
channel negotiation, spectrum hand-off, optimization and spectrum management.
Unfortunately, most of these works underestimate the security issue. In CR net-
works, the technical area of wireless security generally and spectrum sensing in
particular have received little attention. Like all other wireless networks, CR net-
works also inherit various security vulnerabilities. However, due to their unique
characteristics, CR networks face new security challenges and threats. The collabo-
rative spectrum sensing process is not an exception. Two major attacks that target
the sensing process, as defined in [81] are: 1) Primary User Emulator (PUE) attacks
and 2) Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks. In PUE attacks, a
malicious CR node emulates the characteristics of PU transmission signals in order
to prevent other users from accessing the free band for selfish or malicious purposes.
The presence of PUE malicious CR nodes makes the FC believe that the spectrum
band is under PU activity; this gives PUE attackers unrivalled access to the spec-
trum gaps. On the other hand, under SSDF attacks a malicious CR node injects
false sensory information into the central data collector during the fusion process.
This may cause the FC to make wrong spectrum sensing decisions, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Furthermore, an intermediate malicious CR node could manipulate
the received message before forwarding it to the FC. Recent research shows that
SSDF attacks are so severe that they might seriously exacerbate the spectrum ac-
cess probability. The Fusion centre needs to use a robust data fusion technique to
maintain an adequate level of accuracy in the presence of malicious users that fraud
local spectrum measurements.
In this research, we consider only SSDF attacks that target the sensing learning
cycle. In a CR network, the realization of most networking protocols relies on the
channel availability information (e.g., routing protocols [82] and channel rendezvous
protocols [83], [84], [85]). When a malicious node shares false channel information
with the central entity or with its neighbouring nodes, an incorrect decision may
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of malicious SSDF attackers who try to inject tampered data
and degrade the performance of cognitive radio networks.
be made about the channel availability of other nodes and this will affect the op-
eration of the networking protocols. For example, if a channel is free to use but a
malicious CR node claimed it is occupied by PU, this channel cannot be used by
the victim CR nodes for their communications. Consequently, the performance of
CR networks may experience significant degradation. In contrast, if a channel is
occupied by PU but a malicious CR node claimed it is free to use, transmitting
on this channel may lead to harmful interference to the PU communications. The
SSDF attacks will not only significantly degrade the performance of CR networks,
but also cause remarkable difficulties to defend against them. As mentioned above,
although failed data transmissions may indicate that there is an interference with PU
communications, it is really difficult to realize the waste in the available channels.
Recently, a more dangerous SSDF attack has been revealed, in which the malicious
node anticipates which spectrum band will be used by CR users and attacks those
specific bands [86]. Hence, a reliable scheme is needed to fight this type of attack
and identify the malicious CR users.
21
2.8 Existing Security Schemes to Defend SSDF Attacks in CR Networks
2.8 Existing Security Schemes to Defend SSDF
Attacks in CR Networks
Within the literature, certain studies have tried to analyse and justify SSDF attacks.
Wei et al. [87] propose a distributed spectrum sensing algorithm to thwart SSDF
attacks. In their system they characterize the distributed sensing algorithm as an
M-ary hypotheses problem instead of a binary one. They assume the detection
made by the CR nodes is mutually exclusive. Relay nodes are assumed to act
as a bridge between CR nodes and the FC which makes the final decision. In
[88], the authors document reported histories of secondary users and analyse the
Hamming distance between them to calculate the accumulated suspicion level and
distinguish between honest users and attackers. Sodagari et al. [89] use a utility
based mechanism to tackle SSDF attacks through minimizing the surplus utility
of misreporting nodes, leaving minimal motivation for malicious nodes. Rawat et
al. [86] present a reputation-based method to identify SSDF attackers based on how
their transmissions compare with those expected from honest nodes. Based on their
results, this approach is not reliable in the presence of a large number of attackers.
In the presence of 50% independent malicious CR nodes, the FC becomes blind and
unable to differentiate between honest users and malicious users. However, for a
collaborative attack, this ratio decreases to 35%.
A reputation-based collaborative scheme suggested by Zeng et al. [90] is employed
to identify misbehaving nodes. The sensing information from other CR nodes is in-
corporated into the collaborative decision only when their reputation is verified.
In contrast, adversary nodes do not always misreport, thus, the authors adopt a
different approach. Therefore, a new defence scheme that considers this limitation
should to be developed. The authors in [91] propose a dynamic threshold-based
strategy to defend against the SSDF attacks. The proposed scheme updates the
dynamic threshold according to the upper and lower bounds of the fusion value.
Recently, an adaptive reputation based clustering scheme has been proposed to de-
fend SSDF attacks [92]. In their study, a bi-level voting algorithm including of
intra-cluster and inter-cluster is used to make the final decision. In [93], the au-
thors present a detection technique called cooperative neighbouring cognitive radio
nodes (COOPON), whereby legitimate CR neighbours cooperate to detect malicious
users. However, this technique becomes ineffective when the number of malicious
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nodes is significantly high. Some other models apply the multi-armed bandits to
CR network problems. A distributed protocol based on a competitive multi-armed
bandit is applied by Lai et al. [94]. Furthermore, a defence strategy based on non-
stochastic bandits model is present by Wang et al. [95]. In this strategy, transmitter
and receiver adaptively switch their arms without exchanging control information.
Nevertheless, none of the above mentioned papers are able to combat SSDF attacks.
In addition, they assume a distributed policy used individually by each CR node.
A decentralised detection scheme is proposed by [96] to detect malicious SSDF
users. The scheme utilizes a robust outlier-detection technique for the spatial corre-
lation of the received measurements from CR users in close proximity. Neighbours
majority voting strategy is used for CR users to decide whether a specific CR user is
malicious. This scheme requires prior knowledge of the maximum number of mali-
cious CR users. Our scheme does not require prior knowledge of the reliability status
of CR nodes. In [97], the authors suggest a defeating clustering scheme based on an
adaptive reputation algorithm to detect both independent and collaborative SSDF
attackers. However, several issues were not specified by the authors, for example,
how to set the initial threshold for reputation and how the cluster is updated. In
order to secure data authenticity, two localization-based defence schemes are pro-
posed in [98] and [99]. It is assumed that any sensing report that is not endorsed by
at least a threshold number of CR nodes should be dropped by the FC. However,
compromising the threshold number of endorsing nodes will compromise the entire
cell, which is the main drawback of these schemes. In addition, fake sensing reports
can be easily generated by that cell and will be accepted by the FC as a legitimate
report.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no specific protocol that considers
both SSDF attack and end-to-end secure sensing in CR networks. With this moti-
vation and to overcome drawbacks found in the aforementioned works, we propose
a new robust security mechanism to protect sensory information in an adversarial
CR network environment.
• In our proposed scheme, an efficient reputation-based algorithm has been em-
ployed to analyse the behaviour of each CR node. According to its historical
and recent behaviour, the reputation of each CR user is updated. This enables
the FC to select trusted nodes with the objective of eliminating the effects of
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adversaries on the reliability of spectrum sensing data.
• Location information for generating security credentials has been used in many
works. However, unlike other works, our proposed scheme adopts a three-tier
verification process as additional security to decrease the probability of forging
fake sensory data. Hence, to compromise a particular cell, the adversary needs
to control the threshold number of nodes in the cell alongside the trusted nodes
to successfully legitimise the sensory reports.
• The proposed defence scheme considers end-to-end security instead of hop-to-
hop security. The proposed scheme encrypts the sensory data of each node
using a unique secret key in order to protect the confidentiality and the in-
tegrity of sensory messages. Furthermore, we employ a secure authentication
protocol between the FC and the collaborative nodes. Therefore, controlling
intermediate nodes would not result in multiple gain and does not allow the
adversary to break the confidentiality or the integrity of other cells.
• In our proposed algorithm, malicious nodes can be detected very quickly. Thus,
the adversaries and their negative effects can be removed from sensing deci-
sions in a few iterations. This can significantly improve the reliability of the
spectrum sensing decisions.
• Due to its elegant framework, the proposed scheme is flexible for simplification
and modification. For instance, the proposed scheme can be easily expanded
to detect several kinds of attacks beyond the SSDF attack.
2.9 Conclusion
Although broadcasting protocols and defending schemes are active areas of research,
relevant challenges have yet to be studied. The realization of the networking pro-
tocols and the security aspects of CR networks need to be addressed before the
advantages of CR technology can be fully harvested. In this chapter, an overview of
the technical background and a review of the literature underpinning this research
has been provided. We started by discussing the broadcast issue and the challenges
associated with it in cognitive radio ad hoc networks. Additionally, we highlighted
the security threats in CR networks, specifically the SSDF attacks and its effect on
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the performance of the CR network. Furthermore, a survey of existing research re-
lated to the broadcasting protocols and the defending schemes against SSDF attacks
is provided.
In the next chapters, we will present our contributions in the field of spectrum
management techniques for wireless CR networks.
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Chapter 3
Primary Receiver-Aware
Opportunistic Broadcasting in
Cognitive Radio Ad Hoc Networks
In the previous chapter, we have comprehensively studied the state-of-the-art on
broadcasting protocol for CR ad hoc networks. However, very less effort has been
done so far. The main challenge of broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks is how to
prevent CR transmission signals from causing harmful interference to PU communi-
cations. The most common known technique that can be used to address the above
challenge is spectrum sensing, under which a CR user can access the spectrum band
of interest only if the PU activity is measured to be off on the corresponding band.
With the assistant of spectrum sensing, CR users opportunistically exploit unused
frequency bands within radio spectrum. Various spectrum detection approaches
have been proposed, such as primary transmitter detection through energy detec-
tion, matched filter detection, and cyclostationary feature detection [68], [69], [71].
In this chapter, our goal is to investigate the challenge from a different angle. Due to
the complex implementation of spectrum sensing and non-zero probability of false
detection leads us to ask the question: is there an alternative method to spectrum
sensing that enhances the broadcasting goal of CR networks? Our investigation
concludes an alternative technique of achieving the above mentioned objective of
alleviating harmful interference by CR transmission signals to PU communications,
specially PU receivers within the transmission range of CR devices. To achieve this
goal, we examine a location-aware spectrum sharing scenario, where CR users pro-
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(a) Considering PU receiver (b) Without considering PU re-
ceiver
Figure 3.1: A spectrum sharing scenario of considering PU receiver in CR ad hoc
networks
pose to operate over the same frequency band which is dedicated to the licensed PU
users. The goal is to maximise the CR users transmission region, while at the same
time minimising interference to PU communications. Selecting CR broadcasting
channels is very important in order to guarantee the quality of CR and PU com-
munications. To achieve this goal, we examine a location-aware spectrum sharing
scenario, where CR users propose to operate over the same frequency band which is
dedicated to the licenses PU users. Figure 3.1 illustrates a spectrum sharing scenario
of considering PU receivers and the scenario of not considering PU communications
when broadcasting in ad hoc CR networks. Figure 3.1(a) demonstrates that with
the consideration of PU receivers, when a PU receiver is within the transmission
range of a CR, simultaneous transmissions become possible by selecting the proper
frequency band ensuring non-interference to the PU receivers for the CR broadcast-
ing. However, without considering protection to PU communications, concurrent
transmissions are not feasible when a PU receiver is within the interference range of
a CR transmitter as shown in Figure 3.1(b). In this chapter, we define the concur-
rent transmission region as the transmission circle of CR user within which the CR
broadcasting can be carried out without interfering PU receivers.
The main contributions of this chapter are: 1) The broadcasting channel selection
and its impact on PU receivers is mathematically modelled for the first time. 2) The
trade-off between CR successful broadcasting as well as average CR collision risk
with PU receivers is investigated for the first time which takes into consideration the
PU protected zone and the impact of PU activity on the broadcasting process. 3)
Two optimal broadcasting protocols based on the modelled trade-off are proposed for
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CR ad hoc networks. 4) The Network Simulator NS-2 is developed to include the PU
activity model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates
the optimal design of broadcasting protocol under a PU-receiver protection scenario
for CR ad hoc networks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the network model
and assumptions in Section 3.1. We review the broadcast design for CR networks
in Section 3.2. We give detailed description of the proposed broadcast protocol for
CR ad hoc networks in Section 3.3. Performance evaluation is conducted in Section
3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter.
3.1 Network Model
The probable harmful interference that may affect the PU receivers within the trans-
mission range of the CR devices is considered in this work. Thus, as shown in Figure
3.2, PU receivers might be affected by neighbouring CR users’ transmissions and this
can seriously undermine the performance of PU communication. In this work, we
consider a spectrum sharing scenario in which a CR ad hoc network co-exist with a
licensed network. We consider a CR ad hoc network with no centralized coordinator.
In this type of network setting, we assume that the network environment tasks like
spectrum sensing, neighbour discovery, channel selection decision, etc., are accom-
plished by the CR nodes individually. N CR users and M PU transmitters co-exist
in an L x L area, where CR nodes opportunistically access K licensed channels. The
transmission range of a CRi on the k
th channel is represented by a circle with a ra-
dius of R(CRki ). Any CR node within the transmission range of the source CR node
is considered as a neighbouring node of the corresponding CR. A CR receiver within
the transmission range of a CR transmitter is considered as a neighbour only when
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the CR receiver is considered to be convenient for
reliable communications. Furthermore, the CR node is able to detect any PU who is
currently active on the spectrum and within the sensing range of the corresponding
CR. Since different CRs have different local sensing ranges, which include different
PUs, their acquired available channels may be different.
In addition, in this chapter, the PU channel activity is modelled as an ON/OFF
process, where the length of the ON period is the length of a PU occupying a channel
and the length of the OFF period is the length of a channel free from PU activity.
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Figure 3.2: PU receiver protection in CR ad hoc networks.
We assume that PU can randomly select any channel from the spectrum band for
its communications. Furthermore, in this work, the PU transmitters and receivers
are geographically fixed.
If a PU is currently active within the transmitting range of a corresponding
CR, then the CR user is able to detect its presence. Different CR users sense
different PU signals at different locations, hence their acquired available channels
may be different [23][87]. In addition, as the channel availability of each CR is
obtained based on the sensing measurements within its sensing range, a CR user
is not allowed to communicate with CR users outside its sensing range because it
may mistakenly use an active channel and cause an interference toward on-going PU-
communications. Our work focuses on CR ad hoc networks without specific network
topology assumptions, where each user is equipped with a single transceiver and has
limited knowledge of the network environment. Furthermore, we consider practical
scenarios in our design where no global network topology is known and no common
control channel is assumed to exist. The main notations used in the chapter are
summarized in Table 3.1 for easy reference.
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Table 3.1: Symbols used for describing the proposed protocols
Symbols Descriptions
N Set of CR nodes
M Set of PU nodes
K Set of licensed channels
Ni Set of single-hop neighbours of CRi
Ts Spectrum sensing time for CR users
Tt Transmission time for CR users
Φidle The available channel set
Z(PU) The PU protected zone
R(CR) Transmission range of CR user
Ψ The Euclidean distance
3.1.1 Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing aim to identify the available spectrum and prevent any harmful
interference to the primary users. We assume the cognitive radio nodes undertake
spectrum sensing periodically in order to detect any PU activity and ensure up-to-
date information regarding the spectrum occupancy. Furthermore, we assume all
CR users are synchronized to the same sensing cycles. During the sensing duration,
all CR users must be silent and no transmission is allowed. Consequently, the time
needed to disseminate a message in the network will be affected when the CR users
are unable to transmit owing to the enforcement of the silent zone. The spectrum
sensing and the transmission times for any CR user are Ts and Tt respectively.
Where Tt is the effective duration of time for which transmission is allowed for any
CR node on any choice of free spectrum, while Ts is the duration of time that all
CR nodes must be silent for the purpose of sensing. Ts +Tt gives the frame time for
each user when considered together.
3.1.2 Neighbour Discovery
In order to successfully deliver the broadcast messages to all the CR nodes in each
neighbourhood, CRs must discover the network topology and the common idle chan-
nels that can be used to communicate among neighbours, these tasks typically ac-
complished during the neighbour discovery. In the absence of a common control
channel, discovering neighbours in CR ad hoc networks is undoubtedly a challeng-
ing task, we propose a neighbour discovery mechanism to address this issue. Initially,
we assume that individual nodes are tuned to different channels and have no prior
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knowledge of their neighbours and the network topology. Furthermore, each CR
node maintains the local idle channel list based on the information received from
the spectrum sensing. At the beginning of constructing the network, every CR node
has to broadcast its information (node’s id and its available channels) on all the
locally available channels, one-by-one. As a result, all single hop neighbours that
are tuned to any idle channel could receive a copy of this message. Each CR node
receives this beacon message and records the transmitter’s CR node information in
its single-hop neighbours list Ni. After forming and configuring the network, the
CR nodes do not have to beacon messages unless there is a change in their channel
availability.
3.2 Reviewing Broadcast Design in CR ad hoc
Networks
In order to investigate the broadcast design in CR ad hoc networks without a com-
mon control channel, two straightforward schemes of broadcasting in CR ad hoc
networks, random broadcasting strategy and full broadcasting strategy are explored.
Understanding their mechanism and identifying their limitations will serve as an
important first step toward proposing a new broadcasting protocol for CR ad hoc
networks. It has been noticed that both broadcasting strategies have some draw-
backs which make them infeasible to be used in multi-hop CR ad hoc networks. In
the rest of this chapter, the term sender is used to indicate a CR source node that
broadcasts messages. In addition, the term receiver is used to indicate a CR who
has just received the broadcast packet and will rebroadcast it to its neighbouring
CR nodes.
3.2.1 Random Broadcasting Strategy
The first broadcasting scheme we investigate is called the random broadcasting
strategy. Due to the absence of other CR nodes’ channel availability information
before issuing the broadcast process, a CR sender takes a straightforward action by
randomly selecting a channel from the set of available channels as the broadcast-
ing channel. Correspondingly, because CR receivers are unaware of senders channel
availability information, it is difficult to constantly stay on a single channel through-
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out the broadcast process. This channel may not be available for the receiver, which
can lead to failures in the broadcast procedure. Therefore, the only reasonable action
for the CR receiver is to randomly pick up an available channel for message reception
in each time slot. If by somehow the receiver selects the same channel as the sender,
the broadcast messages can be successfully delivered. Under blind information CR
ad hoc networks, this broadcast strategy can be easily implemented. Nevertheless,
this scheme cannot promise protection to PU communications or channel rendezvous
(i.e., the receiver and the sender tune onto the same channel at the same time and
set up a communication link). In other words, the sender tries its best to deliver
the broadcast message to its neighbouring CR nodes in each time slot. When the
number of available channels is large, the probability of matching channel selection
between the sender and receiver is low, thus the probability of successful broadcast
using the random broadcasting strategy is fairly low. In Figure 3.3, we show the
simulation results of the random broadcasting strategy using different numbers of
available channels and PU activity. We define the packet delivery ratio as the prob-
ability that all CR nodes in the network receive the broadcast message successfully.
It is clear from Figure 3.3 that when the number of channels is large, the random
broadcasting strategy leads to a very low successful delivery rate. In addition, we
define the interference risk for PU as the total number of times CR messages collide
with PU messages. It is shown in Figure 3.4 that the random broadcasting scheme
causes harmful interference to PU communications specially when the PU activity
on the channels is high, which is not well suited to be used in multi-hop CR ad hoc
networks when the number of available channels is large.
3.2.2 Full Broadcasting Strategy
The second broadcasting scheme we investigate is called the full broadcasting strat-
egy under which each CR node broadcasts to all the available channels in the spec-
trum. Different from the random broadcasting strategy where the channel is ran-
domly selected by a CR in each time slot, in the full broadcasting strategy, a CR
sender transmits to all the available channels by broadcasting the message sequen-
tially to all its available set of channels. Indistinguishably, a CR receiver listens
sequentially to its available channels. Furthermore, we use two different channel
hopping schemes for the full broadcast strategy: i) the random channel hopping se-
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quence in which each CR node randomly visits all the available channels (denoted as
Full Broadcasting I); and ii) the sequential channel hopping sequence in which each
CR node sequentially visits all the available channels (denoted as Full Broadcasting
II).
In Figure 3.3, we show the simulation results of the full broadcasting strategy
using different channel hopping schemes under different numbers of available chan-
nels. Similar to the random broadcasting strategy, the full broadcasting strategy
also suffers a low packet delivery ratio when the number of channels is large for both
channel hopping sequence schemes. This is because these channel hopping schemes
in the full broadcasting strategy can not guarantee reliable channel rendezvous.
In addition, compared to the Full broadcasting I strategy, the Full broadcasting II
strategy leads to a significant low packet delivery ratio when the number of available
channels is large. On the other hand, it is shown in Figure 3.4 that the full broad-
casting strategies lead to very high interference collision rate when the channels are
under high PU activities. Furthermore, the Full broadcasting II strategy leads to an
extremely high collision rate when the probability of finding an idle channel is low,
compared to the Full broadcasting I strategy. Hence, it is not suitable for broadcast
in CR ad hoc networks where successful broadcast messages is often required.
3.2.3 Observations
It is clear from the aforementioned discussion that these straightforward broadcast-
ing strategies cannot be used in multi-hop CR ad hoc networks due to the discussed
limitations. We obtain two important insights for designing an efficient broadcast-
ing protocol for CR ad hoc networks based on the outcomes of investigating these
broadcasting strategies. Firstly, it is obvious that the three strategies (random
broadcasting, full broadcasting I and full broadcasting II) cannot achieve high de-
livery rates when the number of available channels is large. This is because these
strategies cannot assure channel rendezvous as shown in Figure 3.3. Therefore, the
channel availability information of other CR nodes is required for channel hopping
sequences in order to guarantee channel rendezvous which results in very successful
delivery rates. Secondly, all these broadcasting strategies are quite costly when the
number of channels is large in terms of the negative interference collision risk on the
PU communications generally and on PU receivers specifically, which is not advan-
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Figure 3.3: Packet delivery ratio of the random and full broadcast strategies using
different numbers of channels.
tageous for efficient broadcast. This is because CR nodes need to broadcast blindly
on all the available channels in the spectrum. In the case of using only a subset
from the available channels for broadcasting, the successful delivery rate may de-
creased considerably. Furthermore, as fewer channels are used for broadcasting, the
harmful interference with PU communications may reduced accordingly. Moreover,
if CR nodes select the tuning channels randomly, there are very less chances that the
neighbouring CR transmitters also use the same channel for broadcasting. Thus,
an intelligent channel selection scheme is essential for broadcasting protocol that
reduces the interference to PU receivers and maximizes the message dissemination
reachability.
Considering the aforementioned observations, hereafter we list the key character-
istics required for a robust control channel selection scheme in CR ad hoc networks:
1) Primary Users restrictions: The broadcasting scheme should guarantee that
CR users transmissions do not cause negative interference to PUs.
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Figure 3.4: Probability of PU interference collision risk of the random and full
broadcast strategies using different channel activity.
2) CR neighbour connectivity: A good channel selection protocol should increase
the probability of successful message delivery to single-hop CR neighbouring
nodes.
3) Distributed decision: In decentralized CR ad hoc networks, CR nodes have
to make decisions autonomously. Hence, channel selection decision should
be made based on locally inferred information and without the help of any
centralized authority.
4) CR sender and receiver rendezvous: The broadcasting scheme must ensure
that both transmitter and receiver tune with high probability on the same
channel.
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3.3 The Proposed Broadcast Protocol
In this section, we introduce our intelligent distributed broadcasting protocol for effi-
cient broadcast in ad hoc CR networks. The straightforward broadcasting strategies
are not adequate for CR ad hoc networks, as mentioned in Section 3.2. Accord-
ingly, based on the realizations that we obtained from these broadcasting schemes,
a broadcasting protocol should be able to intelligently select the broadcast channel
according to the current network characteristics which guarantees successful broad-
cast operation without causing interference to the PU communications. In addition,
it should support a channel hopping scheme for both the CR sender and the CR
receiver in order to guarantee channel rendezvous.
We propose an intelligent and distributed protocol for efficient broadcasting in
ad hoc cognitive radio networks. The problem is formulated by investigating the
trade-off between maximizing successful CR broadcast and maximizing PU receiver
protection. The proposed protocol picks the broadcast channel carefully and adapts
itself according to the current network characteristics in order to guarantee successful
broadcast operation without interfering with the PU communications. To guarantee
the protection of PU receivers, it is also important to ensure that a CR transmission
signal does not affect the PU transmissions area. Indeed, selecting a channel that
overlaps with PU receivers may undermine the performance of PU nodes. The
key for achieving an efficient broadcast that enables the coexistence of both PU
and CR transmissions within a specified vicinity is to apply strict control over the
channel selection. With the proposed protocol, every CR node individually classifies
the available channels based on local observations of the primary activities over the
primary channels and the channels connectivity. This classification is then refined by
deciding which channel will be used for broadcasting as it has the minimum overlap
with the PU protected zones. In addition, a CR node with no data to transmit uses
the same criteria to select the tuning channel that offers best connectivity for data
reception. Moreover, it is likely that CR users in the transmitter’s vicinity share the
same channel availability, hence, adopting the same classification by all CR nodes
in the network allows the nodes within a close geographic area to choose with high
probability the same channel. Once a CR receives a packet, it undergoes the same
procedure again to convey the data to its CR neighbours. The proposed protocol
ensures perfect protection for the PU communication and guarantees a high packet
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broadcast ratio.
We next describe the detailed operation of the proposed protocol and different
metrics that influence the choice of broadcasting and channel selection. The CR-
specific metrics considered during channel selection are (i) propagation characteris-
tics of the wireless spectrum, (ii) primary users protected zone, (iii) average degree
of overlap, (iv) probability of spectrum availability and (v) CR users’ connectivity.
3.3.1 Propagation Characteristics of Wireless Spectrum
Since not all wireless spectra have the same propagation characteristics, frequency
has a significant effect on radio communication. At the low-band spectrum, ra-
dio waves tend to have better propagation and penetration characteristics than the
high-band spectrum. Using the same level of transmission power, a lower frequency
signal goes further than higher frequency. Thus, the lower frequencies of the ra-
dio spectrum are often considered quite valuable. Comparatively speaking, lower
frequency spectrum requires fewer transmitters to cover an equivalent area than a
higher frequency. The spectrum propagation characteristics of low frequencies help
in enhancing the end-to-end latency and improving the per-hop coverage distance.
Hence, allowing the network to be covered by fewer intermediate transmitters. In
addition, lower bands can result in lower energy consumption compared to higher
bands. This is a particularly useful advantage for CR users of battery-powered
devices such as laptops, sensors, smart-phones, etc.
The CR node’s transmission coverage depends on the propagation characteristics
of the selected channel. As radio signals propagate out from the ith CR node’s
antenna, its intensity decreases with distance, d. Assuming the simple path loss
propagation model, we obtain the maximum propagation distance R(CRki ) of the
CR node at which the received power is above the system-dependant threshold,
given as:
R(CRki ) =
[
CRtxpower
CRδpower
(
c
4pifk
)2] 1
α
, (3.1)
where fk is the frequency of the k
th channel, CRtxpower is the CR user transmission
power, CRδPower is the CR receiver threshold, c is the speed of light and α is an at-
tenuation factor. The CR node’s transmission coverage is proportional to the square
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of the operational frequency, therefore a lower frequency will have a better propa-
gation distance. CR networks should prefer spectrum band with better propagation
characteristics when considering coverage, power consumption or latency.
3.3.2 Primary Users Protected Zone
Based on the concept of coverage range, the performance of a PU receiver can be
modelled as a function of its distance from the PU transmitter. Therefore, the
coverage area of the PU transmitter must be protected from any CR transmissions
to prevent any interference from the unlicensed users affecting the licensed users.
The coverage range of a Primary User Base Station (PUBS) transmitter can be
defined in many ways. For instance, once a target signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
fixed, the maximum distance from the PU transmitter which guarantees that a PU
receiver is able to decode the signal and achieve the targeted SNR is known as
the coverage area. Assuming flat Rayleigh fading for the PUs and the maximum
transmission power of the PUBS transmitter is fixed and equal to PU txpower, the SNR
at distance d from the PU transmitter is given by,
SNR(d) =
PU txpower σ
N0
d−β |h|2, (3.2)
where N0 is the noise power, β is the path loss exponent, σ is the attenuation
factor considered as constant due to shadowing effects and h is the channel fading
gain distributed as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit
variance. The PU’s protected zone (the radius of the protected contour) of a primary
user j using channel k is defined as the distance at which the average SNR at the
PU receiver is equal to a given value γ. Therefore,
Z(PUkj ) =
(PRtxpowerσ
γ N0
) 1
β
. (3.3)
The CR broadcast protocol must provide protection to the PU receivers by re-
ducing the possibility of interference within the PU protected area.
3.3.3 Average Overlapping Degree
The potential interference to the existing PU receivers can be mapped as the size
of the intersection region between the coverage areas of a PU and the CR transmit-
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Figure 3.5: General overlap case between PU transmitter and a CR node.
ters. Reducing this vulnerable region will minimize interference to primary radio
communications. Figure 3.5 shows two nodes PUj and CRi represented by two cir-
cles of radii equal to the PUj and the CRi transmission ranges Z(PUj) and R(CRi),
respectively. We start by calculating the expected area of intersection between the
two nodes. Practically, the CR user can use the radio resources if no PU receivers
exist within its transmission area.
Let Ψ be the Euclidean distance between CRi and PUj.
Ψi,j =
√
(xcr − xpu)2 + (ycr − ypu)2. (3.4)
CRi and PUj completely overlap if Ψ = 0, and there is no overlapping if
Ψ ≥ R(CRi) + Z(PUj). To obtain the average intersection area between CRi and
PUj, assume that the two circles intersect in some area I(CRi, PUj). Then the in-
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tersection area I(CRi, PUj) can be obtained based on geometrical calculations [36],
I(CRi, PUj) = R(CR
k
i )
2 cos−1
[
R(CRki )
2 − Z(PUkj )2 + Ψ2
2ΨR(CRki )
]
+ Z(PUkj )
2 cos−1
[
Z(PUkj )
2 −R(CRki )2 + Ψ2
2ΨZ(PUkj )
]
− 1
2
√
W (W − 2R(CRki ))(W − Z(PUkj ))(W − 2Ψ), (3.5)
R(CRki ) is obtained from equation (3.1), Z(PU
k
j ) is the radius of the protected
contour of the primary user transmitting on the kth channel obtained from equation
(3.3), Ψ is the distance between the CR and PU nodes as shown in Figure 2 and
W = (Ψ+R(CRki )+Z(PU
k
j )). If both PU and CR users have the same transmission
range (R), the average intersection area can be simplified to,
I(CRi, PUj) = 2R
2 cos−1
[
Ψ
2R
]
− 1
2
Ψ
√
4R2 −Ψ2 . (3.6)
Using these results, the average overlapping degree (AOD) can be calculated as:
AODki,j =
I(CRki , PU
k
j )
piZ(PUkj )
2
. (3.7)
In a scenario where multiple PU transmitters occupy the kth channel, the CR
user’s transmission might affect a set of PU protected zones according to their
positions in the plane. In order to exploit the spectrum efficiently and guarantee
the performance of the PU communication, we need to calculate the total average
overlapping degree of the channel before using it.
AODki,j =
N∑
j=1
AODi,j . (3.8)
The overlapping region represents the area where PU receivers may be presented.
In order to protect these PU receivers, each CR node must choose the channel that
has the minimum overlap with the PU’s protected zone for its transmission. The
average overlapping degree is a valuable input metric which must be considered
when developing a protocol for cognitive radio networks.
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3.3.4 Probability of Spectrum Availability
The performance of CR networks is closely related to the activities of the primary
users over licensed channels. Therefore, the estimation of these activities plays an
essential role in the performance of any cognitive radio protocol. The PU activity
model has been used very widely in the literature [36], [100], [101], [102], [103], [104],
[105]. The primary user traffic can be modelled as an alternating renewal process
consisting of ON (busy) and OFF (idle) periods. In this model, both ON and
OFF periods of the primary users are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), where the alternating renewal process is modelled as a two state
birth-death process with death rate λoff and birth rate λon [65], [103], [104],.
Let 1
λon
and 1
λoff
be the average ON and OFF times of the kth channel. The
probability of the kth channel being busy is given by:
P kbusy =
λoff
λon + λoff
, (3.9)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ K (the total number of channels). Therefore, the probability
of utilizing the kth channel (i.e., the channel being idle) without causing harmful
interference to the primary users is:
P kidle = 1− P kbusy =
λon
λon + λoff
. (3.10)
Let Φ represent the set of channels that meet the user requirements, i.e. channels
that have a probability of availability equal to or greater than the threshold proba-
bility Pth. From equation (3.10), for each CR node the set of channels Φ is chosen
such that:
Φkidle ≥ Pth, ∀k ∈ Φ : 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (3.11)
3.3.5 CR User Connectivity
Successful packet delivery in CR networks depends on a good channel selection algo-
rithm. In fact, selecting a channel that connects a larger number of CR neighbours
as a broadcast channel will result in a high level of network connectivity and con-
sequently increase the packet delivery of the broadcast packets [106], [100]. The
CR connectivity (CRC) reflects the ratio of CR neighbours having the same chan-
nel used by the transmitter in their unoccupied channel list. For a particular CR
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user i broadcasting on channel k, the CR users’ connectivity of the kth channel is
calculated as follows:
CRCki =
ϕ
Ω
, (3.12)
where ϕ is the total number of neighbours who share the same channel k in their
free channel list Φ, and Ω is the total number of single-hop neighbours of CR user i.
As connecting most of the CR users is important, each CR node must choose
the channel that has maximum connectivity with its single-hop CR neighbours for
its transmission. The CR users’ connectivity is an important input metric when
developing a broadcast protocol for cognitive radio networks.
In order to calculate the CR user connectivity, each CR user needs to acquire
information regarding neighbouring nodes and their channel availability. This in-
formation can be obtained through the neighbour discovery mechanism as in [106].
In addition, our proposed protocol can jointly work with any neighbour discovery
mechanism.
3.3.6 Broadcast Channel Selection Optimization
The CR node autonomously identifies the best channel locally available for broad-
casting based on combining the above described metrics for the preferred objective.
In order to better investigate the trade-off between maximizing the successful broad-
cast ratio as well as maximizing the protection to PU communications. We formu-
late two optimization functions, maximize PU protection (MPUP) and maximize
CR connectivity (MCRC). They achieve two different broadcast goals, along with
the constraints as given below:
To find: Channel k ∈ K, (3.13)
MPUP : To Minimize: = AODki,j R(CR
k
i ), (3.14)
(or)
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MCRC : To Maximize: = CRCki R(CR
i
j), (3.15)
Subject to:
P kidle ≥ Pth, (3.16)
CRCki ≥
1
Ω
, (3.17)
AODki,j < ξ. (3.18)
1) MPUP broadcast: The major objective of this function is the protection of
the primary users, particularly the undetected PU receivers. The interference
between the ith CR transmitter and the primary receivers in the jth PU pro-
tected zone is mapped as a function of average overlap, AODki,j. Since the
primary users communication protection is considered more important than
CR connectivity in this type of broadcast, our optimization function tries to
minimize the product term of the CR propagation distance, R(CRi), and the
average overlap between cognitive-primary transmission coverages. Minimiz-
ing the value of the metric AODki,j, will result in improving the PU receivers’
protection. Moreover, smaller distances for CR propagation cause a smaller
probability of interference to PU users. The optimization function chooses
the best channel k which has the minimum overlap with the PU protected
zone. Algorithm 3.1 represents the details of our proposed distributed channel
selection for this objective.
2) MCRC broadcast: For this broadcast class, the priority is to increase the
packet delivery reliability by increasing the CR network connectivity. The
propagation distance for a given transmission power and the CR connectivity
are composed in one product term MCRC. Hence, MCRC is maximized to
enhance the transmission coverage of CR users so that the highest number
of CR nodes can receive the transmitted packets over the largest possible
transmission distance. The optimization function selects the most efficient
channel that maximizes the CR network connectivity. Algorithm 3.2 represents
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the details of our proposed distributed channel selection for this objective.
The choice of the channel must meet the user-specified constraints (equations
3.16, 3.17 and 3.18):
(i) The channel availability at each CR node must meet the user-assigned con-
straint in equation (3.16). In this work, we assume that Φ is the set of channels
that probabilistically meets the constraint of channel availability, Pth.
(ii) The ϕk in the CR users’ connectivity formula (CRCki ) reflects the number
of CR neighbours who might be using the kth channel for communication. If
none of the neighbours share this channel with the sender (i.e., ϕk = 0 ), then
broadcasting over this channel will result in a disconnected CR network.
(iii) Finally, the average overlapping degree AODki must not exceed the maximum
threshold of interference, ξ, which is specified by the user in equation (3.18).
The pseudo-codes for selecting the broadcasting channels are shown in Algorithm
3.1 and 3.2.
3.3.7 Protocol Flow Chart
This section summarizes the procedure of the proposed broadcasting schemes. In
Figure 3.6, we illustrate the flow chart of the proposed broadcast protocol. As
shown in the flow chart, before the starting of the broadcast process, every CR
node first classifies its locally available set of channels and discovers its single-hop
neighbouring nodes using the neighbour discovery scheme proposed in [106]. If the
main goal of broadcasting is to protect primary receivers, each CR node calculates
the overlapping degree of all the available channels with the PU protected zones and
selects the broadcasting channel based on Algorithm 3.1. On the other hand, if the
priority is to maximize data dissemination, CR node uses the best channel that offers
best connectivity with its single-hop neighbouring nodes and broadcasts message
based on Algorithm 3.2. Every CR node uses either Algorithm 3.1 or Algorithm 3.2
according to the broadcast goal, whether it is the source or the receiver node. Since
all nodes in the close vicinity are more likely to share the same channel availability,
and as all nodes use the same metrics to select the broadcasting channel, there is
high probability to guarantee channel rendezvous.
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Algorithm 3.1 Selecting the broadcast channel BCi for a CR node i, priority to
PU receivers protection
1: INPUT: Φidle,Ωi, R(CR)i, AODi
2: OUTPUT: BCi
3: BCi ← ∅
4: u← 1
5: min← R(CR)1.AOD1
6: for u = 1 to K do
7: if R(CR)u.AODu < min then
8: min← R(CR)u.AODu
9: BCi ← u
10: end if
11: end for
12: return BCi
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Algorithm 3.2 Selecting the broadcast channel BCi for a CR node i, priority to
CR connectivity
1: INPUT: Φidle,Ωi, R(CR)i, AODi
2: OUTPUT: BCi
3: BCi ← ∅
4: u← 1
5: max← R(CR)1.CRC1
6: for u = 1 to K do
7: if R(CR)u.CRCu > max then
8: max← R(CR)u.CRCu
9: BCi ← u
10: end if
11: end for
12: return BCi
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Figure 3.6: Proposed broadcast protocol flow chart
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3.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyse the performance of our proposed broadcasting protocols,
MPUP and MCRC through extensive simulations.
3.4.1 Implementation Setup
We have implemented the proposed protocols using the Cognitive Radio Cognitive
Network (CRCN) patch of the NS-2 simulator [107]. As shown in Figure 3.7, there
are three building blocks that support the functionalities of CR networks in the
Cognitive Radio Cognitive Network (CRCN) patch of the Network Simulator (NS-
2). These blocks are the cognitive radio physical layer, the cognitive radio MAC
layer and the cognitive radio network layer. The physical layer supports several
functions, like propagation model, controlling the transmission power, SNR, etc.
The MAC layer is responsible for spectrum sharing and mobility, keeping track of
PU traffic activity, etc. The network layer maintains the neighbour list and the
routing information. In addition, It is responsible for making the channel selection
based on the information shared between all the layers. The cross layer coordinator
collects and shares the information with multiple layers in order to achieve the
highest possible adaptivity of the CR network. The activity of PU nodes is not
modelled in the basic design of the CRCN patch. Therefore, we have developed the
CRCN patch by modelling the PU activity block (dotted box) as shown in Figure
3.7.
The main responsibilities of the PU activity block are to generate and keep
track of PU activities over all the spectrum bands. i.e., keep tracking the spectrum
utilization over the simulation time (sequence of OFF and ON periods by PU nodes).
Accordingly, channel availability follows these parameters.
3.4.2 Performance Parameters
We assume the primary users are the TV broadcast towers, where its locations are
fixed and known by the CR users. We consider a network topology of a square
region with sides 1000 m that is further divided into four square cells as shown in
Figure 3.8. Four PUs were located at the centre point of the cells and a total of 100
CR nodes are randomly distributed in the whole area. We consider the free space
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Figure 3.7: The CRCN patch of NS-2 including the PU activity model.
path loss model for CR users and Rayleigh fading channels for PU users. The PU
transmitters have a transmission range of 250 m, while the transmission range of
each CR node is 100 m. In addition, each CR also has a circular sensing range with
a radius of 150 m. Hence, if a PU is currently active within the sensing range of a
CR node, the corresponding CR is able to detect its activity. In order to get stable
performance results, we repeat the experiments for 1000 times and the results are
averaged, where each packet is sent by a randomly selected CR node. Since our goal
is to efficiently disseminate the broadcasting data, protect the PU receivers from
harmful interference and rendezvousing both CR transmitter and receiver nodes. In
this chapter, we define the following performance metrics:
(i) Interference risk for PU-receiver: the interference probability of the total num-
ber of times CR packets collide with the PU receivers over the total number
of broadcasting packets
(ii) Interference-time product received: the sum of the product of both the received
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Figure 3.8: Topology used for performance evaluation.
CR powers and the time for which this power is detected by the primary nodes
(iii) Successful packet delivery ratio: the average number of packets successfully
delivered in the network
(iv) CR network connectivity: the accumulative number of CR receivers per hop
that successfully received the broadcast packet
In addition, we compare our work with the distributed broadcasting protocol
(DBP) proposed in [43].
3.4.3 Protection to PU Receivers
In the first set of experiments, we are interested in comparing the performance of the
proposed algorithms from the viewpoint of the PU-receiver protection. We define
the interference probability as the ratio of the total number of times CR packets
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collide with the PU receivers over the total number of broadcasting packets. It
can be clearly seen from Figure 3.9, that our proposed protocol MPUP causes less
harmful interference to the PU nodes. This is primarily because, in MPUP, the
CR nodes opportunistically select the channel that causes the least overlap with
the PU protected zone which in turn reduces the interference probability with PU
receivers. MPUP reduced the interference collision by more than 24% for moderate
PU activity and up to 40% for higher PU activity over the channels when compared
to DBP. Although, MCRC does not consider the PU receivers that might exist in
the PU protected zones, it always outperforms DBP by using the channel which has
the lower probability of occupancy. It can be noted that the interference probability
increases with PU activity. This is because more channels will be occupied by
PUs which makes it difficult to find a channel that does not interfere with the PU
communication.
The average CR transmitted power and the duration for which this power is
observed at the PU receivers is measured to evaluate the interference risk of the
proposed protocol onto locations inside the PU protected zones. We define the
interference-time product for the PU receivers operating on the primary channel as
the sum of the product of both the received CR powers and the time for which this
power is detected by the primary nodes. The interference to PU receivers depends
on the average overlapping area as well as the PU activity over the selected channel.
As can be observed from Figure 3.10, the collision risk with the PU receivers is
trivial for MPUP. This is due to the appropriate optimization metrics that result in
selecting the proper channel for broadcasting which must avoid any overlapping with
the PU receivers’ protected area. It is observed that the proposed protocols have
the best protection for PU communication, particularly MPUP which guarantees the
protection for PU receivers in the PU zones. As shown in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, the
proposed broadcast protocol outperforms other schemes in terms of less interference
collision risk with PU receivers.
3.4.4 CR Performance
In this set of experiments, the packet delivery ratio and the CR network connectivity
have been measured in order to evaluate the performance of the broadcast protocols
from the viewpoint of the CR network.
51
3.4 Performance Evaluation
Probability of channel being under PU activity
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
In
te
rf
er
en
ce
 r
is
k 
fo
r 
P
U
 r
ec
ei
ve
rs
 (%
)
0
20
40
60
80
100
MCRC
MPUP
DBP
Figure 3.9: Probability of PU interference due to transmissions from CR users on
occupied channel.
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Figure 3.10: The effect of CR users transmissions on PU receivers.
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We define the average delivery of packets as a metric to evaluate the process of
data dissemination reliability. Figure 3.11 shows the percentage of messages received
by CR nodes under varying channel availability. It is clear that MCRC outperforms
other techniques for data delivery reliability. The packet delivery ratio for MCRC
is nearly double the packet delivery ratio for MPUP. This is due to the fact that
the main objective in MCRC is the CR network reachability. Hence, the CR users
prefer to select the channel that offers the maximum connectivity with the CR nodes
in their vicinity. On the other hand, avoiding interference to PUs is of paramount
importance in MPUP. Consequently, CR nodes under the PU coverage zone for
the chosen channel are no longer reachable by CR transmitter nodes. Nevertheless,
MCRC, MPUP and DBP exhibit a gradual increase in the packet delivery ratio as
the probability of the channel availability increases. This is due to the fact that
lower PU activity increases the chances for CR nodes finding PU-free channels for
their transmission. It is worth noting that the diversity in the channel availability
and the PU activity will result in the creation of different CR topologies [106], which
makes it hard to reach a higher number of CR nodes in the neighbourhood. By using
the appropriate metrics and employing the same intelligent algorithms, we achieve
better results.
Furthermore, we also consider the CR network connectivity as a metric to evalu-
ate the CR performance of our proposed broadcasting algorithms. The CR connec-
tivity is explained as the mean of accumulative receivers that successfully received
the transmitted packet. Figure 3.12 represents the number of accumulative CR re-
ceivers for each algorithm. MCRC achieves better network connectivity compared to
MPUP. As in MCRC the priority is to select the channel which offers the largest cov-
erage area and connect the maximum number of CR nodes. Increasing the coverage
area will increase the average number of CR nodes reached by a single transmission
which results in better reachability. On the other hand, MPUP maintains the chan-
nel which guarantees extra protection to the PU receivers. Consequently, CR nodes
under the PU coverage zone for the chosen channel are no longer reachable by CR
transmitter nodes.
It is observed that at each new hop the ratio of CR receivers decreased. This
is because the probability of collisions increases as the message propagates in the
network. Therefore, for all the techniques, at each new hop, the CR connectivity
decreases.
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Figure 3.11: Successful broadcast ratio using different probabilities of channel avail-
ability.
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Figure 3.12: Ratio of average number of CR neighbours per hop that successfully
receive the transmitted packet.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a fully-distributed broadcast protocol for CR ad hoc
networks that makes the following contributions: i) alleviates the interference colli-
sion risk to PU communications; ii) guarantees protection to the PU receivers and
iii) provides a high successful broadcast ratio. Furthermore, we consider practical
scenarios in our design where no global network topology is known or no common
control channel is assumed to exist. A key novelty of this work is the formulation
of the broadcast issue from the viewpoint of protecting PU receivers, which is a
distinctive feature in CR networks.
55
Chapter 4
Broadcast Protocol for Cognitive
Radio Ad Hoc Networks
In this chapter, a distributed reliable Cognitive Radio Broadcast Protocol (CRBP)
for cognitive radio ad hoc networks is proposed that makes the following contri-
butions: (i) reliable data dissemination, (ii) joint transmitter-receiver channel se-
lection, (iii) protection of primary users’ communication and (iv) coordinating the
broadcast process without the need for a common channel. A key novelty of the
proposed CRBP is the formulation of the broadcast problem from the viewpoint of
connecting different local topologies, which is a unique feature in cognitive radio net-
works. We jointly map the network topologies and the spectrum observations onto
a bipartite graph which allows the channel selection undertaken at each node to
capture the spectrum information and the environmental topologies of all the neigh-
bouring nodes. This secures the network connectivity and reduces the interference
with primary users. The reliability is ensured by connecting different topologies and
synchronizing adjacent nodes. Furthermore, we believe that the consideration of dif-
ferent topologies in the same neighbourhood, transmitter-receiver synchronization
and the coordination of the broadcast process without a common channel uniquely
distinguishes CRBP from the other works in the literature.
This chapter starts by Section 4.1, which presents the unique challenge of suc-
cessful broadcasting in CR networks. Then, the system model and assumptions are
described in Section 4.2. The chapter continues with Section 4.3, which presents
the proposed broadcast protocol for CR ad hoc networks. Performance evaluation
is conducted in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.1 The Unique Challenge
In this section, we address the unique challenge of reliable broadcast in CR ad hoc
networks. Since broadcast messages often need to be disseminated to all or most
of the possible nodes, the broadcast protocol has to achieve a very high successful
broadcast rate. In CR ad hoc networks, the broadcast channel for single-hop reliable
broadcast may not always be one channel due to various reasons. Therefore, a CR
node may not be able to deliver the broadcast message to its single-hop neighbouring
node even if that node in the same transmission area. However, during the broadcast
procedure, it may broadcast the packet via different channels to cover other CR
nodes. This is different from the broadcast schemes in traditional ad hoc networks,
whereby nodes usually broadcast messages on one channel. This feature imposes a
unique challenge of identifying the broadcast channels that connect all neighbouring
CR nodes to each CR node.
To further illustrate the challenges associated with broadcasting in CR ad hoc
networks, we consider a simple single-hop network shown in Figure 4.1, where node
A is the source node with N neighbours. In traditional single-channel or multi-
channel ad hoc networks, all nodes follow the rules of a precise wireless standard.
Due to uniform channel availability, broadcasting is easily implemented as all nodes
can be tuned to a single common channel as shown in Figure 4.1(a). Thus, node
A only needs to transmit over one channel to let all its neighbouring nodes receive
the broadcast message. On the contrary, broadcasting in CR ad hoc networks is a
challenging task and much more complicated. Allocating a single channel for broad-
casting in CR networks makes the entire operation vulnerable to the PU user activity.
CR users should immediately stop their transmission and vacate the channel once
PU activity appears on the broadcast channel. This makes the broadcasting opera-
tion vulnerable to suspending as long as there is a PU node active on that channel.
Furthermore, in CR networks different CR users might acquire different channels at
different times. This prevents the allocation of one single channel for all network
nodes, as shown in Figure 4.1(b), where node A may have to broadcast the message
using different channels in order to deliver the broadcast message to all neighbours.
In the worst case scenario, each neighbouring node may tune on a different channel,
as a result, the source node has to broadcast over N channels. Indeed, the successful
delivery of the broadcasted message for neighbouring nodes within a single hop in
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(a) Traditional ad hoc network
(b) CR ad hoc network
Figure 4.1: An example demonstrating the unique challenge when selecting the
broadcast channel
CR ad hoc networks relies on connecting different local topologies. The broadcast
channel(s) should be carefully selected and dynamically allocated to guarantee the
network operation.
4.2 System Model and Assumptions
In this section, we present the system model and the basic assumptions related to
our proposed work.
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4.2.1 Network Model
We consider a CR ad hoc network with no centralized coordinator. In this type
of network setting, we assume network environment tasks like spectrum sensing,
neighbour discovery, channel selection decision, etc., are accomplished by the CR
nodes individually. The general network structure consists of a set of M Primary
Radio (PU) nodes {PU1, PU2, ..., PUm} and a set of N Cognitive Radio (CR) nodes
{CR1, CR2, ..., CRn} in the same geographical area. Primary nodes can access their
designated licensed spectrum with no restriction. While, CRs can access licensed
bands opportunistically, i.e. they are allowed to use the idle licensed bands only if
they do not interfere with ongoing PU transmissions. Note that an idle state de-
scribes the temporal availability of a channel. To prevent interference, CR users are
capable of sensing spectrum opportunities using energy detectors, cyclostationary
feature extraction, pilot signals or cooperative sensing [7], [66], [69], [71] [72]. Our
proposed protocol can work with any underlying MAC protocol or spectrum sensing
techniques.
We consider the set of K non-overlapping orthogonal frequency channels (Cglobal =
C1, C2, ..., Ck), which may be freely occupied by the PU. Each CR node knows the
global channel set Cglobal and can operate on a subset Clocal of this global channel
set depending on the local channel availability at that node, where Clocal ⊆ Cglobal.
For simplicity, we assume that all channels have the same capacity. However, our
protocol can be easily extended to channels of different capacities. In our model, we
assume that CR nodes are equipped with half-duplex transceivers that can either
receive or transmit (not both) on a single channel at any given time. Each CR can
swiftly hop between channels using software defined radio (SDR) technology. The
utilisation of a single transceiver lowers the operative cost of the CR device [108],
and avoids any possible interference between adjacent transceivers due to their close
proximity [109]. Each CR has a circular transmission range with a radius of CRt.
All CR nodes within the transmission range of the sender are considered as single-
hop neighbouring nodes. In addition, every CR has a circular sensing range with a
radius of CRs. Moreover, the CR node is able to detect any PU who is currently
active on the spectrum and within the sensing range of the corresponding CR. Since
different CR users have different local sensing ranges which may include different
PU activities, their acquired available channels may be different.
59
4.2 System Model and Assumptions
Table 4.1: Symbols used for CRBP description
Symbols Descriptions
N Set of CR nodes
Cglobal Total number of channels
Ci The available channel set of CRi
Ni Set of single-hop neighbours of CRi
Ts Spectrum sensing time for CR users
Tt Transmission time for CR users
CrPU Transmission range of PU users
CrCR Transmission range of CR users
G(X,Y,E) Bipartite graph
e(i, j) The link that connects CRi and CRj
BCSi Broadcast channel set of CRi
TCi Tuning channel of CRi
Throughout this chapter, we assume the channel status does not change in a
short period of time, i.e., channel availability is relatively stable with respect to the
protocol execution time. Therefore, this work is more suited to spatial spectrum
underutilization and the case of temporal underutilization when the PU activities
are not very dynamic. The main notations used in the chapter are summarized in
Table 4.1 for easy reference.
In the rest of the chapter, we use the term ”sender” to indicate a CR node that
wants to issue a new broadcast or rebroadcast the received packet. In addition, we
use the term ”receiver” to indicate a CR that has not yet received the broadcast
packet.
4.2.2 Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing aims to identify the available spectrum and prevent any harmful
interference to the primary users. We assume the cognitive radio nodes undertake
spectrum sensing periodically in order to detect any PU activity and ensure up-to-
date information regarding the spectrum occupancy. Furthermore, we assume all
CR users are synchronized to the same sensing cycles. During the sensing period,
all CR users must be silent and no transmission is allowed. Consequently, the time
needed to disseminate a message in the network will be affected when the CR users
are unable to transmit owing to the enforcement of the silent zone. The spectrum
sensing and the transmission times for any CR user are Ts and Tt respectively.
Where Tt is the effective duration of time for which transmission is allowed for any
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CR node on any choice of free spectrum, while Ts is the duration of time that all
CR nodes must be silent for the purpose of sensing. Ts +Tt gives the frame time for
each user when considered together.
4.2.3 Neighbour Discovery
In order to successfully deliver the broadcast messages to all the CR nodes in each
neighbourhood, CRs must discover the network topology and the common idle chan-
nels that can be used to communicate among neighbours, these tasks are typically
accomplished during the neighbour discovery. In the absence of a common control
channel, discovering neighbours in CR ad hoc networks is undoubtedly a challenging
task, we propose a neighbour discovery mechanism to address this issue. Initially,
we assume that individual nodes are tuned to different channels and have no prior
knowledge of their neighbours and the network topology. Furthermore, each CR
node maintains the local idle channel list based on the information received from
the spectrum sensing. At the beginning of constructing the network, each CR node
has to beacon its information (node’s I.D and available channels) on all the locally
available channels, one-by-one. As a result, all single hop neighbours that are tuned
to any idle channel may receive a copy of this message. Each CR node receives this
beacon message and records the transmitter’s CR node information in its single-hop
neighbours list Ni. After forming and configuring the network, the CR nodes do not
have to beacon messages unless there is a change in their channel availability.
4.3 CRBP Broadcast Protocol
In this section, we introduce CRBP, the proposed broadcast protocol for ad hoc
cognitive radio networks. The main idea of the CRBP broadcast protocol is to let
the sender broadcast on the most efficient subset of its available channels from the
original available channel set in order to guarantee reliable broadcasting in CR ad
hoc networks. The proposed protocol decomposes a complicated CR network into
a simpler CR network so that the complexity of the original CR network can be
reduced and an efficient selection of broadcast channels can be acquired. The aim
of CRBP is to increase the reliability and the reachability of data dissemination
over multi-hop ad hoc CR networks. The CRBP protocol adapts itself according
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to the current network characteristics to guarantee successful broadcast operation.
Thus, every CR node autonomously classifies the available channels based on local
observations of PU activities over these channels. This classification is then refined
by identifying the minimum set of channels that should be used for broadcasting.
The tuning channel for a given node is selected from this set, which is the best
channel in the set that has no PU activity and could serve a higher number of CR
neighbours. The tuning channel selections of both the sender and the receiver are
designed for guaranteed channel rendezvous.
The CRBP tries to converge CRs which have similar spectrum opportunities to
the same tuning channel so as to increase the network connectivity, which in turn
reduces the number of transmissions over multiple channels and the delay in packet
dissemination. The reason for pursuing such a goal is twofold. Firstly, grouping
CRs with similar available channels implicitly implements hard-decision cooperative
sensing [76,110]. Secondly, it reduces the size of the channel set required to connect
all the neighbouring nodes. To ensure the packet is conveyed to all the neighbouring
nodes for each packet transmission, the sender broadcasts the packet over a minimum
set of idle channels that are common between the sender and the neighbouring nodes
in its vicinity. Additionally, CR nodes with no data to transmit classify the channels
based on the same criteria in order to tune to the best channel for data reception.
Using the same criteria for all nodes in the network, allows CR users in close ge-
ographic areas to select, with high probability, the same channel set. It is likely that
CR nodes in the sender’s vicinity have the same PU activity, hence channels avail-
able to a CR sender are also available to its neighbours with high probability [111].
Therefore, CRBP increases the probability of creating a connected topology. Once
a packet is received, every intermediate CR receiver undergoes the same procedure
again to convey the message to its neighbours. CRBP is designed with the follow-
ing properties in mind: (i) decentralization: distributed implementation of channel
allocation, (ii) convergence: CR users with the same available channels individu-
ally converge to the same channel decisions, (iii) delay and communication efficient:
channel allocation is achieved with no exchange of messages and (iv) adaptability:
reallocation is required only in the case where there is a change in the network
topology.
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4.3.1 Probability of Channel Availability
The performance of CR networks is closely related to the activities of the licensed
users over the licensed channels. Therefore, the estimation of these activities plays
an essential role in the performance of any cognitive radio protocol. The primary
user traffic can be modelled as an alternating renewal process consisting of on (busy)
and off (idle) periods [7,101,102]. This PU activity model has been used very widely
in the literature [36,100–105]. The on time represents the period where the channel
is occupied by a primary user, while the off time indicates the channel is free and can
be used for cognitive radio transmission without causing any harmful interference to
PU nodes. In this model, the on and off periods of the primary users are assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), where the alternating renewal
process is modelled as a two state birth-death process with death rate µoff and
birth rate µon [102]. Since each PU node arrival is independent, the lengths of the
on and off periods are exponentially distributed with mean value equal to βn and
αn, respectively [101,112].
Let 1
µon
and 1
µoff
be the average on and off times of the kth channel. The on
time represents the period where the channel is occupied by a primary user, while
the off time indicates the channel is free and can be used for cognitive radio trans-
mission without causing any harmful interference to PU nodes. Let Φbusyk denote
the probability of finding the kth channel to be busy, then Φbusyk is given by
Φbusyk =
µoff
µon + µoff
, (4.1)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ K (the total number of channels). Therefore, the probability of the
kth channel being idle is:
Φidlek = 1− Φbusyk =
µon
µon + µoff
. (4.2)
Let λk represent the set of channels that meet the user requirements, i.e. chan-
nels that have a probability of availability equal to or greater than the threshold
probability Φidleth . From equation (4.2), for each CR candidate-forwarding node the
set of channels λk is chosen such that:
Φidlek ≥ Φidleth ,∀k ∈ λk : 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (4.3)
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The channel set accessibility probability Ψ(λk) at each CR node can be calculated
based on the availability of the chosen channel set as given below:
Ψ(λk) =
∏
i∈k
Φidlei . (4.4)
4.3.2 Bipartite Graph Formation
In this section, the idea of formulating the local network topology by a bipartite
graph is introduced. A bipartite graph constructed by a CR node is represents both
single-hop neighbours and available spectrum bands over which it can communicate.
Based on the constructed graph, a CR node can select the minimum set of channels
through which it can reach all its neighbours on all different local topologies. Details
of constructing such a graph are explained below. In addition, an example is given
to illustrate the process of the proposed protocol.
4.3.2.1 Construction of the Local Network Topology
Based on the joint temporal and spatial distribution of licensed spectrum availabil-
ity, different CR nodes might observe different sets of available channels as well
as different neighbours. In order to start communicating with other nodes, each
CR node has to identify its idle channels, discover the neighbouring nodes in its
vicinity and information about their channels. Once the CR node becomes aware of
its single-hop neighbours information, it can build up its local view of the network
topology.
Let G(V,E) denotes the topology of a CR ad hoc network, where the set of all
CR nodes in the network is denoted by V and the set of all links in the network is
denoted by E. The problem of selecting the best set of channels for reliable broadcast
is described as: given a CR ad hoc network topology G(V,E), what is the minimum
set of channels that successfully connects all CR nodes of G(V,E)?
Connecting different local topologies in CR ad hoc network may not be possible
through a single broadcasting channel due to various reasons. Therefore, a CR user
may not be able to deliver the broadcast message to all its single-hop neighbours.
However, it may broadcast the message on different channels during the broadcast
procedure. This is different from traditional ad hoc networks, where nodes usu-
ally broadcast messages on only one channel. This feature imposes an exceptional
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challenge of identifying the set of broadcasting channels that connects all the local
topologies, especially for complex network topologies.
The CR network topology and the set of shared idle channels among neighbouring
nodes can be jointly modelled as a bipartite graph [50]. A graph G(V,E) is called a
bipartite graph G(X,Y,E) if the set of vertices V can be divided into two disjoint sets
X and Y with X ∪ Y = V, such that each edge in E has one endpoint in X and the
other in Y. As each CRi senses a free channel set λi and receives information from
a set of single-hop neighbours Ni on their idle channels, then it can construct an
undirected bipartite graph which jointly represents the similarities between its own
idle channels and the idle channels of its neighbours. For our purposes, a bipartite
graph Gi(Xi,Yi,Ei) is constructed by CRi, where the set of vertices Xi represents the
one-hop neighbours Ni plus CRi, the set of vertices Yi represents the set of available
channels λi, while the set of vertices Ei represents the common available channels
between CRi and its single-hop neighbours. An edge (x, y) exists between vertex
x ∈ Xi and a vertex y ∈ Yi if and only if y ∈ λj, i.e., channel y is in the idle channel
set of both CRi and CRj. Note that CRi is connected to all vertices in Yi, since
Yi = λi. The graph model is then used as the basis for computing the broadcast
channel set.
4.3.2.2 An Illustrative Example
We use the example shown in Figure 4.2 to illustrate the process of constructing
the bipartite graph. Figure 4.2(a) shows that the topology graph for the original
CR ad hoc network consists of eight nodes. The idle channel sets for each CR node
are as follows: λA = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10}, λB = {2, 4, 7, 9}, λC = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7},
λD = {2, 3, 7, 10}, λE = {2, 3, 7, 8, 9}, λF = {3, 4, 6, 8, 9}, λG = {3, 6, 8, 9} and
λH = {2, 3, 6, 8, 9}. In Figure 4.2(b), we show the bipartite graph GA(XA,YA,EA)
constructed by CRA. The set of vertices XA correspond to CRA plus its single-hop
neighbours NA, XA = {A,B,C,D,E, F}, while the set of vertices YA corresponds
to the set of idle channels λA = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10}. Note that CRA is connected
to all vertices in YA, since YA = λA. In Figure 4.2(c), we present the bipartite graph
GB constructed by CRB, for the same topology of Figure 4.2(a). Note that GA 6= GB
despite the fact that CRA and CRB are one-hop neighbours. This holds true because
NA 6= NB and with different physical locations it is expected that λA 6= λB.
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(a) 8-node CR network
(b) Bipartite graph constructed by node A
(c) Bipartite graph constructed by node B
Figure 4.2: The connectivity graph and the construction of the bipartite graph.
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4.3.3 Broadcast Channel Set Computation
The minimum number of channels through which a CR node can reach all its single-
hop neighbours has to be chosen to reduce the total number of broadcasts and
the overall congestion in the network. Therefore, based on its own bipartite graph
Gi(Xi,Yi,Ei), every CR computes the minimum Broadcast Channels Set (BCSi)
and assigns the best channel as the Tuning Channel (TCi). The problem of finding
the minimum broadcasting channels set for each CR node can be modelled as the
set cover problem.
The set cover problem is as follows: given a set of n elements called the universe
U = {U1,U2, ...,Un} and a collection of m sets of U, S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, find the
smallest sub-collection C of S such that C covers all elements in U [113]. C is a set
cover if and only if
⋃
Si∈C
Si = U.
For our purpose, finding the minimum but the most effective BCS, we represent
the universe by the set of vertices X, the collection by the set of vertices Y and the
inclusion of elements in sets as edges. We have now transformed Y into a set of
subsets of X and the task now is to find a minimum cardinality subset of Y vertices
which covers the entire vertices of X. Finding the minimum set cover is an NP-
complete problem [114]. For a bipartite graph of small size, an exhaustive search
may be feasible. However, the space of possible solutions grows exponentially with
the cardinality of the vertex set. Hence, a greedy heuristic algorithm for finding a
cover set with a minimum number of channels has been developed in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 iteratively examines a single channel and chooses the channel
which covers the largest number of uncovered nodes in each round. The vector
BCS holds the indexes of the channels that have already been chosen, while U
holds the set of CRs that are not covered yet by the channels in the BCS. Initially,
BCS is empty while U = Xi and S = Yi. In each iteration, we find the channel
Si from S which has the highest overlap with U. We then add Si to BCS, remove
it from S, remove CR users covered by Si from U. The process terminates when
U is empty. Accordingly, all single-hop CR nodes are now connected with the
source node by at least one of the selected channels. The list of selected channels is
updated accordingly after each iteration. The output is the broadcast channels set
BCS, ranked in descending order based on the number of the neighbours served per
channel. The idea behind prioritising channels in descending order is twofold; first:
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to enable the CR node to pick the first channel in the list as the TC which guarantees
the maximum connectivity with its neighbouring nodes, second: when transmitting,
the source node will guarantee the maximum number of its neighbouring nodes
is achieved at the first transmission, the second highest number of neighbours is
achieved at the second transmission, and so on. The pseudo-codes of the proposed
algorithm for calculating the broadcast channel set and the tuning channel is shown
in Algorithm 4.1.
4.3.4 Protocol Flow Chart
This section outlines the procedure of the proposed CRBP protocol. The flow chart
of the proposed broadcast protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.3. As shown in Figure
4.3, before broadcasting any message, every CR node first identifies its own available
channels and discovers its single-hop neighbouring CR nodes. Whether it is the
source node or not, the CR node uses its local network information, the set of
available channel λk and the list of neighbours Ni to construct the bipartite graph
based on Algorithm 4.1. Then, it computes the BCS. Finally, if this node is the
source node, it hops and broadcasts the message on each channel of the broadcast
channel list according to the priority list. On the other hand, if this CR node
is not the transmitter, it is by default a receiver node. Then, it assigns the best
channel as the TC. If the intermediate-node receives the broadcast message from
another sender, it rebroadcasts this message using the channels calculated based on
Algorithm 4.1.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
We have implemented CRBP with the NS-2 simulator, where a total of 100 CR
nodes are randomly deployed within a square region of sides 1000 m, each having
sensing and transmission times given by TS = 0.1 s and Tt = 0.6 s respectively. Sim-
ulations run for 100 s. A total of 100 packets were sent, where each packet is sent by
a randomly selected node after 1 s. Each group of simulations is repeated 100 times
and the results are the average values over 100 times. We set the communication
range of each PU node CrPU = 250 m, moreover, the CR user has a transmission
range CrCR = 150 m.
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Algorithm 4.1 Calculation of the broadcast channel set and the tuning channel
Require: Gi(Xi,Yi,Ei)
1: U← Xi, S← Yi, BCS ← ∅, TC ← ∅
2: while U 6= ∅ do
3: for i = 1 to |S| do
4: Find Si ∈ S, such that |Si ∩ U| is max
5: if there is more than one Si ∈ S achieve the same goal then
6: choose Si which has the highest probability of channel availability
7: end if
8: if TC = ∅ then
9: TC = Si
10: end if
11: end for
12: BCS ← BCS ∪ Si
13: S← S \ Si
14: U← U− Si ∩ U
15: end while
16: return BCS, TC
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Figure 4.3: Cognitive radio broadcast protocol operation flowchart
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As a point of reference, we compare the performance of our CRBP protocol against
three broadcasting protocols: (a) random strategy (RS), (b) selective broadcasting
(SB) presented in [38] and (c) SURF strategy proposed in [37]. We suggested RS
strategy because it is the simplest one and no information is required. In RS, chan-
nels are randomly picked to be used by CR nodes for transmission and/or receiving,
without any consideration of the ongoing PU and CR activity over these channels.
In SB, a CR node broadcasts the information over a selected group of channels in-
stead of a single channel. In this approach, the node might need to listen to more
than one channel. SB does not provide any synchronization between transmitter
and receiver nodes. However, SURF classifies the channels on the basis of PU un-
occupancy and CR occupancy, then selects the best one for transmission. Since the
transmission is done over a single channel, any CR node within the transmission
range of the sender and overhearing on a different channel will not be able to receive
the transmitted information.
Since, our goals are to: i) protect the PU communication from potential inter-
ference, ii) efficiently broadcast the data across the network, and iii) merge neigh-
bouring nodes to the same channel decision, we have defined five metrics to evaluate
the performance of CRBP:
1) Potential Interference Ratio (PIR): It is defined as the ratio of the total number
of times the selected channel is unavailable due to the PU activity after the
channel selection decision is taken over the total number of times the channel
selection decision taken. This metric outlines the potential interference with
the ongoing transmission of PU nodes over the selected channel(s).
2) Network Connectivity Ratio (NCR): This metric evaluates the connectivity
of the network as well as the data dissemination process. It represents the
proportion of total number of nodes successfully received the message (actual
number of receivers) over the total number of the CR nodes in the network.
3) Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): It represents the ratio of the packets received
by a particular CR node over the total number of packets sent on the network.
This metric is used to effectively analyse the packet dissemination process.
4) Decision Convergence Ratio (DCR): This metric is used to compare the con-
vergence of the channel decision by a particular CR node with its single-hop
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neighbours. It is the ratio of the total number of CR neighbours that share the
same channel for overhearing over the entire number of neighbouring nodes.
5) Channel Set Size (CSS): This metric is defined as the number of the channels
used by the source node for broadcasting a packet toward its single-hop neigh-
bours. The lesser the size of the channel set, the more efficient the algorithm.
4.4.1 PU Communication Protection
In this section, we characterize the Probable Interference Ratio (PIR) caused by
CR nodes to PU nodes due to an inappropriate channel decision from CRBP, RS,
SB, and SURF. Figure 4.4 clearly shows that CRBP causes less interference to PU
nodes, compared to RS, SB, and SURF. This is primarily because, in CRBP, the
CR nodes opportunistically use the unutilized channels for transmission based on
real-time sensing, which reduces the interference with the PU communications. Note
that in CRBP, at the time of transmission, if there is no idle channel due to PU
activity over all the channels the CR will not transmit the data. Figure 4.4 shows a
tiny PIR value for CRBP, which demonstrates the instances where there is no idle
channel and a potential interference would be caused if a transmission continued. It
can be clearly seen from fig. 4.4, that the PIR value decreases once the number of
channels increases. When the number of channels Ch = 10, the value of PIR is lower
than when Ch = 5. This is because a higher number of channels increases the prob-
ability for nodes to find PU-free channels for CR transmission. Accordingly, CRBP
alleviates collisions with primary communication, which provides better protection
for the on-going PU transmission.
4.4.2 Reliability and Reachability of the Data Dissemina-
tion Process
In this section, we evaluate the performance of CRBP from the viewpoint of CR
network connectivity. Network connectivity ratio (NCR) is defined as the proportion
of accumulative CR receivers over the total number of the CR nodes in the network.
Figure 4.5 compares the network connectivity ratio for RS, SB, SURF and CRBP.
It is worth noting the diversity in terms of the channel availability and the PU
activity as well as the distributed channel decision result in the creation of different
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Figure 4.4: The effect on PU nodes due to transmissions by the CR users on the
occupied channel
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the network connectivity ratio
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network topologies (clusters) at each CR node. CRBP beats this problem by creating
communication links to other topologies through transmitting over the minimum set
of channels to cover all the CR nodes in its vicinity. It can be clearly seen that CRBP
outperforms the other protocols in term of network connectivity. CRBP is intelligent
to create linked network topology of 81% (Ch = 5) and 89% (Ch = 10) CR receivers.
SURF could produce a connected network topology of 38% (Ch = 5) and 41% (Ch =
10) CR receivers. SB can make a connected network topology of 25% (Ch = 5) and
21% (Ch = 10) CR receivers. While RS is only able to produce a connected network
topology of 6% (Ch = 5) and 3% (Ch = 10) CR receivers. It is worth mentioning
that with the increase of the number of channels, CRBP performance is also slightly
enhanced. This result is not unreasonable, since adding more channels spreads nodes
over more channels and makes rendezvousing neighbours harder. Nevertheless, by
employing the proper metric and utilising the same algorithm at both CR sender
and receiver, CRBP attains finer results when the number of channels increase. This
is because with extra channels, the chances of finding a free-PU channel increased.
4.4.3 Packet Delivery Ratio
The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) of RS, SB, SURF and CRBP are shown in Figures
4.6 and 4.7, where total number of channels(Ch) is Ch = 5 and Ch = 10 respectively.
CRBP performed very well compared to other protocols and it significantly increases
the packet delivery ratio. In particular, CRBP guarantees approximately a 76%
packet delivery ratio for Ch = 5, while in RS, it is almost 3%, 21% in SB and 32%
in the case of SURF. While when Ch = 10, CRBP provides almost an 83% packet
delivery ratio, compared to almost 1% in the case of RS, 17% for SB and 29% for
SURF. Table 4.2 shows the simulation results of the successful packet delivery ratio
under different number of channels. It is worth noting that the diversity in terms of
the channel availability and PU activity result in the creation of different network
topologies (clusters) at each CR node. As shown in Table 4.2, CRBP overcomes this
problem by creating communication links to other topologies by transmitting over
the minimum set of channels to cover all the CR nodes in its vicinity, which in turn
maximizes the reachability of the broadcast messages.
As a matter of fact, RS does not guarantee that the selected channel is free from
PU activity for its transmission, thus causing a harsh reduction in the delivery ratio.
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Figure 4.6: CR nodes and successful packet delivery ratio, Ch=5
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Table 4.2: Successful packet delivery ratio
Packet Delivery Ratio
Broadcast Technique ch=5 ch=10
Cognitive Radio Broadcast Protocol (CRBP) 76% 83%
SURF 32% 29%
Selective Broadcasting (SB) 21% 17%
Random Strategy (RS) 3% 1.2%
In SB, although the transmission is achieved through multiple channels, it provides
a reduced delivery ratio compared to CRBP. In some cases, the transmitter may
not have any effective receivers due to lack of transmitter/receiver synchronization
between nodes (i.e., the overhearing channel is selected randomly). In the case of
SURF, the transmission occurs over a single channel which means only the nodes
tuning to that channel and within the transmission range of the source node will
receive the message. While in CRBP, each CR node delivers the message to all the
neighbours through selecting channels that provide high probability for connectivity,
which in turn maximises the reachability of the broadcast messages. It is worthy
remembering that for all the techniques, with the message replication and propaga-
tion at each new hop, the chances of collisions enlarges and accordingly, the packet
delivery ratio decreases. In summary, based on results obtained and shown in Fig-
ures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, CRBP guarantees the best network connectivity by increasing
the data dissemination reliability in multi-hop cognitive radio ad hoc networks. It
is important to highlight that with an increase in the number of channels, CRBP
performance is also slightly enhanced. This result is not unreasonable, since adding
more channels spreads nodes over more channels. However, by using the proper
metric and mainly employing the same algorithm at the sender and the receiver,
CRBP achieves better results when more channels are available.
4.4.4 Decision Convergence Ratio
In this section, we evaluate and characterize the merging between neighbouring
nodes to the same channel decisions. The Decision Convergence Ratio (DCR) has
been defined as a metric for this purpose. Grouping the CR nodes with similar
channel decision increases the probability of effective and reliable data dissemina-
tion, reducing the number of channels required to connect all the neighbouring nodes
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and implicitly implement cooperative spectrum sensing. Figure 4.8 compares the
ratio of total number of neighbours sharing the same receiving channel over the
total number of CR neighbours for the four protocols: RS, SB, SURF and CRBP.
CRBP has almost equal ratio of similar neighbours tuning decision to SURF, while
higher numbers of neighbours sharing the same tuning decision compared to RS,
and SB. This is primarily because both algorithms CRBP and SURF employ the
same algorithm at the sender and the receiver that select the channel that offers best
group-level connectivity (i.e., the channel that connect a higher number of neigh-
bours) as the receiving channel. This will result in providing a good synchronization
between the neighbouring nodes. Since, CRBP also provides best network-level con-
nectivity (i.e., links up other neighbours who tune onto other channels). Therefore,
the majority of neighbouring nodes will receive the transmission message success-
fully which provides a good connectivity. In addition, this causes an increase in the
ratio of accumulative receivers and the packet delivery ratio in the network as shown
in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
4.4.5 Channel Set Size
In this section, we evaluate and compare the Channel Set Size (CSS) used by CR
nodes to broadcast the message for the four protocols. The CSS is defined as the
number of channels used by the transmitter for broadcasting a packet to its single-
hop neighbours. Figure 4.9 compares the CSS with respect to the number of available
channels for RS, SB, SURF and CRBP. It can be observed that SB uses most of the
available channels for broadcasting. In addition, the channel set size increases when
the number of available channels increases. This is because, with an increase in
the number of idle channels, CR nodes are spread over more channels. As a result,
the CR node needs to transmit over more channels. However, the CSS in the case
of CRBP is reasonable. Furthermore, the number of used channels does not have
too much of an affect with the increase in number of the available channels. This
is obtained thanks to CRBP which uses proper metrics to prevent CR nodes from
scattering over all available channels and merges the neighbouring nodes to the same
channel decision, which in turn results in a dramatic reduction in the channel set
size. RS and SURF use only a single channel for the transmission regardless of the
number of available channels. Due to the non-uniform channel availability, especially
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the possibility of the unavailability of a global common channel, it is hard to use a
single channel for broadcasting in CR networks. Since CRBP also connects other
topologies in the vicinity, the majority of the CR neighbouring nodes will receive the
transmitted message successfully, which results in an increase in the packet delivery
ratio.
4.4.6 Packet Ratio Description
In the traditional single channel wireless network, when nodes broadcast packets, all
the single-hop neighbouring nodes will receive that packet due to all nodes working
on the same channel. There is only one reason that may result in the loss of the
transmitted packet, and this is collision. This is not the only reason to lose a packet
in CR networks. Many other reasons cause the loss of the transmitted packet in CR
networks, like interruption with PU communication, CR nodes tuned to different
channels and collision between CR nodes.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our broadcast protocol. We have
defined four different types of packet ratio (the ratio of delivered packets, the ratio of
misplaced packets, the ratio of collided packets and the ratio of interrupted packets)
as performance metrics to analyse and evaluate the performance of our proposed
protocol.
1) Delivered packet ratio: It represents the proportion of the CR nodes that suc-
cessfully received the broadcast packets over the total number of neighbouring
nodes. This ratio is used to quantify the data dissemination accomplishment.
2) Misplaced packets ratio: It represents the proportion of CR nodes that lost the
packets because they tuning on channel different from the transmitter over the
total number of neighbouring nodes. This ratio measures the packets lost due
to CR node listening on the wrong channel.
3) Collided packets ratio: It is defined as the total number of CR nodes that did
not receive the transmitted packets owing to collisions with CR nodes over the
total number of neighbouring nodes. This ratio is used to quantify the collided
packets with the CR nodes.
4) Interrupted packets ratio: It represents the ratio of the CR nodes that did not
receive the broadcast packets owing to the interruption with PU nodes over
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the total number of neighbouring nodes. This ratio is used to quantify the
interrupted packets with the PU nodes.
Two comparisons for the packet ratio of RS, SB, SURF and CRBP, when Ch
= 5 and Ch = 10, have been demonstrated in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 respectively.
The different packet ratios have been measured in a single-hop context and multi-
ple sources have been taken into consideration throughout the multi-hop network.
It can be clearly seen, as expected, CRBP provides higher packet delivered ratio
compared to RS, SB, and SURF. This is primarily because CRBP emphasize on
connecting all nodes in the neighbourhood. If the number of available channels is
large, the probability that two neighbouring nodes select the same channel is fairly
high. However, when the number of channels is high, this leads the other protocols
to scatter CR nodes among most of the available channels. On the other hand,
opposite behaviour can be seen in the misplaced packets ratio. There are fewer lost
packets in CRBP compared to the other works. This is due to the fact that CRBP
selects the channels that provide higher connectivity with the neighbours as the
receiving channel, while RS and SB select the tuning channel randomly. It is noted
that when the total number of channels increases from Ch = 5 to Ch = 10, the ratio
of lost packet for both RS and SB increases. This is because when more channels
are available, the CR neighbours are scattered over new channels and when nodes
broadcast to the channels, there is more chance of CR neighbours being overheard
on a different channel. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show that due to the PU interruption,
RS and SB lost the highest number of packets in comparison with SURF and CRBP.
This is due to CRBP considers real time sensing for the PU activity when selecting
the channel for broadcasting. Moreover, in CRBP, with more available channels, the
interrupted packet ratio decreases. This is due to the fact that when the number
of channels increase, CRBP gets a better chance of finding unoccupied channels.
Finally, the collided packet ratio increases with the increase in the number of suc-
cessful transmissions for all the techniques. Both the ratio of delivered packets and
the ratio of lost packets (misplaced, collided, interrupted) demonstrate that CRBP
achieves better packet delivery to the neighbouring nodes, compared to RS, SB, and
SURF protocols.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed and investigated CRBP, a distributed and intelli-
gent broadcasting protocol for reliable packet dissemination in CR ad hoc networks.
The main design objective of CRBP is to reliably disseminate the control informa-
tion through connecting different local topologies, which is a unique feature in cog-
nitive radio networks. By jointly mapping the network topologies and the spectrum
observations onto a bipartite graph, CRBP allows each node to capture the spec-
trum information and the environmental topologies of all the neighbouring nodes.
This secures the network connectivity and reduces the interference with primary
users. The reliability is ensured by connecting different topologies and synchro-
nizing adjacent nodes. Simulation results attest that CRBP is superior in reliable
broadcasting compared to random broadcasting, selective broadcasting and SURF
broadcasting protocols. Furthermore, we show that different from other techniques,
CRBP achieves better results when the number of channels increases. This is owing
to the intelligent channel selection mechanism.
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Chapter 5
Reliable Collaborative Spectrum
Sensing for Cognitive Radio
Networks in Malicious
Environments
Cognitive radio is a promising technology where CR users can opportunistically
access the under-utilized spectrum. However, CR networks face new threats due
to their unique characteristics. Malicious CR nodes could adversely degrade the
performance of collaborative spectrum sensing through providing false local sensory
reports to the fusion centre which lead to incorrect sensing decisions. Developing an
efficient security mechanism and model for secure spectrum sensing is a challenging
task due to the new classes of security threats and challenges in CR networks. In this
chapter, we present the Reliable Collaborative Spectrum Sensing Scheme (RCSSS),
a novel and robust defence scheme to counter the SSDF attacks in cognitive radio
wireless networks. The proposed scheme can significantly improve the reliability
and the accuracy of collaborative spectrum sensing in adversarial environments. In
the proposed scheme, when a CR node generates a sensing report based on local
observations, it creates a unique signature using its own secret key and collects some
signatures from different neighbouring CR nodes in its vicinity. Before sending to
the FC, the final report is encrypted using the cell’s key. Once the message reaches
the FC, it is certified as valid sensory data only if it passes the three-tier verification
process (i- the report must be signed by the unique secret key belonging to the
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sender, ii- different signatures of CR users from the same cell must be included, iii-
the report must be sealed by the trusted nodes). In addition, we use an efficient and
fast reputation-based classification scheme to further analyse the behaviour of each
node. Malicious CR nodes should be easily classified. Their false reports along with
their negative effects will be cautiously removed from collaborative sensing decisions
in a very short time span.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.1, we describe the system
model and assumptions. In Section 5.2, we present RCSSS, the proposed security
framework and the detection strategy. We analyse the defence scheme against SSDF
attacks and present simulation results in Section 5.3. Finally, we conclude the
chapter in Section 5.4.
5.1 System Model
We consider an infrastructure-based CR network where the channel sensing mea-
surements reported from multiple CR nodes are combined at the central entity,
namely the Fusion Centre (FC), in order to make reliable sensing decisions. We vir-
tually divide the CR network into multiple cells where the information of each CR
node inside a particular cell is bounded to the cell’s key. It is assumed that the CR
network is well-connected and dense enough to support collaborative sensing in the
presence of primary users. It is likely that CR nodes in the same vicinity have the
same PU activity. Hence, sensing measured by a CR node can be detected by mul-
tiple neighbours with high probability [106]. Based on its local observation, every
CR user decides whether a specific channel is occupied or free of use by the primary
user and forwards its report to the FC. It is assumed that the FC is equipped with
efficient storage and computation capabilities to serve as a data collection centre.
Hence, the final decision on channel availability is made by the FC after fusing all
local decisions received from the CR users.
The FC is assumed to be secured and well-protected. In addition, during the
short time of bootstrapping, we assume that no CR nodes can be compromised.
In an ideal CR network where all CR users are honest, most of the local decisions
match the global decisions. However, in some practical situations a CR network
might be subjected to numerous attacks, like eavesdropping, jamming and SSDF
attacks. In this chapter, we consider the problem that malfunctioning or malicious
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CR nodes exist and can severely degrade the performance of collaborative spectrum
sensing through SSDF attack.
An attacking scenario is shown in Figure 5.1, where a malicious node manipulates
the sensing results by injecting tampered data in order to mislead neighbouring CR
nodes and the FC to make a wrong decision regarding the spectrum availability.
We assume that there is a probability β that each CR user may be controlled by
an adversary and become an SSDF attacker. Here, we use β as an indicator of the
network vulnerability to SSDF attacks. The higher the value of β, the higher the
vulnerability of the CR network. We consider a Clairvoyant case in this work and
we assume that the FC already has knowledge of the network vulnerability and is
aware of the precise value of β. In practical situations, when there is no knowledge of
the value of β, a cautious estimation can be used at the cost of spectrum utilization
efficiency. We further assume that the status of each CR user is independent from
other CR users in the network, whether or not it is a SSDF malicious node. Let
N and M denote the number of all CR nodes and malicious nodes in the network,
respectively. Then, the number of honest CR nodes can be easily obtained as H =
N −M . According to the Law of Large Numbers, when the number of total CR
users in the network is large enough, the network vulnerability can be computed
as β ≈ M/N . In contrast to honest users, the main goal of malicious users is to
undermine the operation of the network through poisoning the FC by tampered
data which may or may not meet their actual sensing measurements. The unique
secret key (skCRi) and the unique coefficient (αi) are assumed to be set before
deployment. The main notations used in this chapter are summarized in Table 5.1
for easy reference.
5.2 The Proposed System
In collaborative sensing, all CR nodes share their sensing data with nodes within
their vicinity to jointly determine which spectrum bands are indeed available. Mean-
while, malicious nodes might even enjoy the utilization of free channels by modify-
ing the sensing data, which significantly degrades the performance of collaborative
sensing. By manipulating the radio sensing information, an adversary can affect
the beliefs of a cognitive radio, and consequently its behaviour. In this chapter, we
present RCSSS, a novel multi-layer defence scheme based on a reputation evaluation
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Figure 5.1: Collaborative spectrum sensing model in a CR network where CRs
sense PU signal and send local decisions to the FC where the final decision is made
while malicious attackers may inject tampered data or change other users reports
to degrade the fusion performance.
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algorithm to thwart attacks targeting availability, authenticity and confidentiality
of critical and vital sensing information. The proposed scheme uses two keys to
encrypt the messages between CR nodes and the FC: i) Unique secret key: shared
only between the CR node and the FC, this key is used to provide node authentica-
tion. ii) Cell key: shared only between CR nodes in the same cell and the FC, this
key is used to provide cell authentication. The encryption technique prevents any
node from outside the cell from disclosing the sensing information. Furthermore,
by dynamically updating the reputation of each CR user according to its histori-
cal behaviour, the FC securely classifies CR nodes and makes a trusted nodes list
with the objective of checking the reliability of the sensing data as well as detecting
malicious users.
In existing security models, compromising nodes which are not involved in gen-
erating a particular sensing report may result in compromising that report as well.
Therefore, the novel design of our model successfully eliminates the effects of ad-
versaries on the reliability of spectrum sensing data. In the following sections, we
further detail the proposed defence scheme, starting with the collaborative sensing
management, construction of the virtual cells and exchanging local sensing mes-
sages. This is followed by the report generation, the process of data fusion and the
message verification process at the FC. We also discuss the procedure of selecting
the trusted CR nodes that play an important role in the verification of sensory data
at the FC.
5.2.1 Collaborative Sensing Management
It is highly probable that CR nodes in closed geographical areas sense the same PU
activity. Hence, inside a cell of n CR nodes, a sensing report must be collaboratively
agreed by at least s (1 ≤ s ≤ n) CR nodes in order to be accepted by the FC [98].
Accordingly, any report generated from a cell must hold s different signatures of CR
nodes. Multiple signatures make the system more reliable against threats, since the
validity of the created report can be ensured even if some malicious nodes participate
in the report generation.
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Table 5.1: Symbols used for RCSSS description
Symbols Descriptions
β Probability of network vulnerability
C Encrypted report
CH Primary user channel
CV ki Correlation value between CRi and the FC on k
th channel
d Number of trusted nodes
Ek The encryption function
H Number of honest CR nodes
H(.) The hash function
KAcell Authentication cell key shared among all CR nodes in cell A
l Side length of the cell
M Number of malicious CR nodes
MACk The message authentication code
N Toal number of CR nodes in the network
n Number of CR nodes inside a cell
NBi Neighbours list of CRi
P Large prime number
QF Probability of a false alarm
QMD Probability of missed detection
QSSDF Probability of SSDF attack
R Sensing report
s Threshold number of signatures required to create a report
Si Signature of CRi computed through a LSSS
skCRi Unique secret key of CRi
Spack Group of s signatures from the neighbours of CRi
TRi Trustworthiness value of CRi
xAcell, y
A
cell Coordination of cell A
xcr, ycr CR user coordination
xfc, yfc FC coordination
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5.2.2 Construction of the Virtual Grid
We simply divide the CR network into several virtual square cells. Two important
parameters, the location of the FC as well as the cell side length l, are set before
the deployment. We assume that each CR user has self-localization ability and is
equipped with a GPS (Global Positioning System) unit. In addition, the localization
scheme in [115] might be used by a CR node to obtain its geographic location. We
denote the cell containing CRi by Acell, which is also known by the home cell of that
CR node. The associated coordinates represents the centre of the cell by (xAcell, y
A
cell).
Each CR node calculates the centre location of its current cell using the FC as a
reference point as follows:
xAcell = 0.5
⌈xcr − xfc
l
⌉
, (5.1)
yAcell = 0.5
⌈ycr − yfc
l
⌉
. (5.2)
After calculating the virtual cell coordinates, CRi localized in a particular cell
sends its cell location to the FC requesting the corresponding cell authentication
key. Once the FC receives a request, it sends the cell key alongside the following
parameters (s, p) to the related node encrypted by the unique secret key (skCRi),
which is only known by the ith CR node and the FC.
FC −→ CRi = EskCRi{KAcell, s, p}, (5.3)
where KAcell is the authentication key of a given cell, p is a large prime number over
the finite field GF (p) and s is the minimum number of required nodes that should
participate in the report generation.
5.2.3 Neighbour Discovery
Each CR node broadcasts a HELLO message containing the CR node’s ID and
the location of the current cell (xAcell, y
A
cell). This message is encrypted by the cell
authentication key (KAcell), as this key is shared only between the FC and the CR
nodes in that particular cell, hence the cell privacy is protected. We adopt the
broadcasting scheme and the sensing cycle proposed by [106] for neighbour discovery
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and network construction,
CRi −→ ∗ : EKAcell{CRi, (x
A
cell, y
A
cell)}. (5.4)
Using the cell authentication key, each CR node within the same cell decrypts the
message and responds by an acknowledgement (ACK) message including its node
ID. Assuming CRj is in the same cell (Acell) as CRi, then it can use the cell key
(KAcell) to decrypt the message and reply with an ACK message:
CRj −→ CRi : EKAcell{ACK,CRi||CRj}. (5.5)
Based on the received acknowledgement messages, each node creates its CR
neighbours list (NB) containing the IDs of CR nodes within its vicinity and that
share the same cell. Moreover, to authenticate the cell’s members, each CR node
inside the cell has to send its neighbour list (NB) to the FC via a Message Authen-
ticated Code (MAC) using the node’s unique key (skCRi), that is
CRi −→ FC = MACskCRi (NB, (xAcell, yAcell)). (5.6)
Finally, this message is decrypted at the FC. If a uniform message is received
from all the nodes of that cell, this certifies that the cell constitution is free from
malicious nodes. However, if a malicious node is found, the FC can eliminate that
node and alert the other nodes about the adversary node.
5.2.4 Report Generation
Each CR user CRi ∈ N performs its spectrum sensing on the primary channels at
time t and sends the encrypted sensing report to the FC. The sensing measurements
of PU activity in a particular cell have to be agreed by s CR nodes of that cell before
generating a valid report. The sensing report (R) usually contains information about
channel ID, cell ID, duration of channel occupancy and time stamp, etc. Then, every
participating CR node encrypts R using the cell key (KAcell). As all the generated
reports are encrypted by the cell’s key, any node outside that cell will not be able
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to disclose R. The encrypted report is given as
C = H(.) KAcell R. (5.7)
In order to prevent any malicious users from forging and injecting fake informa-
tion, the sensing report should be authenticated before the FC considers its mea-
surements. In RCSSS, any sensing report from any CR node must hold two types
of authentication: i) a unique signature of the CR node that generates the report
and ii) s signatures from different CR nodes sharing the same cell. For the first tier
of authentication, we compute a unique signature Si from the encrypted report C
using a univariate polynomial of degree s − 1 over the finite field GF (p) and the
node’s unique secret key and coefficient skCRi , αi, respectively [116] as,
Si = F (skCRi) =
s−1∑
u=0
αu(skCRi)
u mod p. (5.8)
The polynomial is evaluated using the node’s unique secret key skCRi , which
is known only by the CRi and the FC. Hence, the authenticity of CRi can only
be verified by the FC using the uniquely generated Si. Finally, CRi collects s −
1 corresponding signatures from same cell neighbouring nodes namely, Spack and
computes the MAC over the collected s signatures, as a second tier of authentication
to the report as MACKAcell(Spack). Thus, the construction of the final report is
finished and CRi sends {CRi, C, MACKAcell(Spack)}.
5.2.5 Sensing Measurements Fusion Process
All the CR nodes make their own decisions about the availability of spectrum bands
and forward this information to the FC. The fusion centre verifies the messages and
monitors the decisions regarding the PUs presence/absence. In order to improve the
reliability of the collaborative sensing process, the FC selects a group of d CR nodes
from each cell to be the trusted nodes of that cell. By adopting d = n−s+i, (i ≥ 1),
CR nodes as trusted nodes in each cell, we guarantee that at least one trusted node
participates in any report generation process. Only reports that have been approved
by the trusted nodes will be considered by the FC as valid reports.
Adopting the trusted nodes’ participation as a third tier of report verification
enhances the security of the system and makes it more difficult for the attacker
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to inject fabricated sensing report into the data collector. Moreover, neither the
adversaries or the CR nodes have knowledge of the trusted nodes, as it is the FC’s
responsibility to select the trusted nodes and it does not share this information with
other users. Hence, compromising any number of CR nodes in the network will not
lead to disclosing the trusted nodes because compromising the FC is the only way
to discover them. For this reason, the adversary node needs to compromise all the
cell’s trusted nodes in addition to s or more nodes from a particular cell in order to
successfully generate a bogus report.
5.2.6 Verifying the Sensory Data at the FC
All the sensing reports must be verified and checked by the FC before they are
considered reliable sensing measurements. Therefore, for each sensing report the
FC has to verify: i) Node authenticity: the availability of a unique signature. The
FC verifies the unique signature (Si) of the i
th CR node using the unique secret
key owned only by the FC and that CR node, ii) Cell authenticity: no less than
s CR nodes have definitely participated in the report generation. The FC uses
the corresponding cell key of the received report to decrypt Spack and verify the
authenticity of all s nodes and iii) The trusted nodes’ participation: whether the
report is certainly approved by at least one of the trusted nodes. Once the original
report is recovered by the FC, the validation of the report is confirmed as only CR
nodes inside that cell have the corresponding cell key. Furthermore, each user has
its unique secret key and only the FC is aware of the trusted CR nodes of each cell.
5.2.7 Trusted CR Nodes List Formation
After collecting all the sensing information from the CR nodes, the FC verifies these
measurements and calculates the final status of the perceived channels. Then, the
FC compares the final status of the channels with the local observations received
from each CR user. Based on the correlation between the concluded channel status
and the local channel observation of each node, the FC updates the trustworthiness
value of each CR user which is denoted by TR and initialised by µ. We denote
the consistency and inconsistency between the FC information and the information
of CRi(t) by CONi(t) = 1 and CONi(t) = 0, respectively. If the received sensing
measurement is similar to the one verified and concluded by the FC, then TRi(t)
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will be increased. Otherwise, we decrease the value TRi(t). In particular, the higher
the trustworthiness value, the more honest the CR node, resulting in promotion to
the cells list of trusted nodes.
Any CR node whose TRi(t) goes below a certain threshold will be identified as
a malicious node and will be excluded by the FC from the trusted node list. We
update the trustworthiness of the CR users at time t based on historical reputation
and the recent value of the consistency function CONi(t) as follows;
TRi(t) = (1− λ)TRi(t− 1) + λCONi(t). (5.9)
We update TRi(t) in two different ways in order to distinguish between a mali-
cious and honest CR user in the network. Therefore, we use two different values of
λ, λ1 and λ2 that are relatively small and large respectively, where λ1 , λ2 ∈ (0, 1).
By doing so, the trustworthiness evolution TRi(t) for the honest node will increase
slowly but it will fall fast for malicious nodes and attackers. When CONi(t) = 0,
this means an attacker is trying to share fake data with the FC. In this case, the FC
uses λ2 to update the node reputation which will decrease TRi(t) quickly and the
node will be easily identified. On the other hand, when CONi(t) = 1, this means
CRi is an honest node and a relatively small λ1 prevents TRi(t) from increasing
quickly. The update process of both cases for TRi(t) is:
TRi(t) =
(1− λ1)TRi(t− 1) + λ1CONi(t), if CONi(t) = 1,(1− λ2)TRi(t− 1) + λ2CONi(t), if CONi(t) = 0. (5.10)
This update mechanism is very efficient against periodic attacking, since TRi(t)
decreases quickly as the attacking time elapses. Consequently, the malicious nodes
can be easily excluded from the trusted node list if their TRi(t) fall below a certain
threshold δ.
5.3 Performance Analysis and Discussion
In this section, we investigate the security strength of RCSSS under random node
capture attacks. Our concern here is to evaluate how a specific fraction of mali-
cious nodes would affect the security of the network. We consider a multi-channel
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CR network comprising of 1000 CR nodes, all randomly deployed. In the following
sections, we analyse the security strength of the proposed defence scheme with re-
spect to two aspects of the design goals, i.e., security of the system against SSDF
attacks and system end-to-end security regarding data confidentiality and integrity.
We compare the performance of our proposed protocol with LEDS [99], BAIS [86]
and COOPON [93].
5.3.1 Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attacks
Malicious CR nodes may want to insert bogus sensing reports with non-existing or
false sensory information in order to spoof the FC. Hence, a full cell is considered
under SSDF attack if any of the malicious CR nodes are able to forge a false sensing
report to the FC regarding that cell. Assume that there are N CR nodes in the
network, n average number of nodes in each cell, s endorsement nodes, d trusted
CR nodes and m malicious CR nodes. Then, there are
(
N
m
)
different ways for the
attacker to compromise m CR nodes and
(
n
s
)
different ways for each cell to select s
CR nodes from n CR nodes in the network to participate in the report generation.
Thus, the product of the aforementioned terms, i.e.,
(
N
m
)(
n
s
)
is the total number of
different ways that an attacker can compromise m CR nodes and the cell selects s
CR nodes to sign the generated report. This is based on the assumption that the
adversary compromises b CR nodes out of the s endorsement nodes for the entire
network. Since s CR nodes are needed to generate a report of any cell, then (m− b)
out of (N − s) nodes must be compromised. Thus, the probability that none of the
s CR nodes is captured by the attacker (i.e., the cells are secured) can be obtained
by;
Ps{0} =
[(
N−s
m
)(
N
m
) ]. (5.11)
In order for a bogus report to successfully pass the verification process and be
accepted by the FC, the adversary has to compromise at least s endorsement nodes
and all the trusted nodes d in the corresponding cell.
Notice that, if the adversary succeeds in compromising a cell in the worst case
scenario, only sensory information of that cell can be forged due to the location-
aware property of the underlying verification. Hence, when compromising m CR
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nodes, the probability that a particular cell is under SSDF attack (i.e., sends a
faulty report to the FC endorsed by at least s CR nodes and the d trusted CR
nodes) is a conditional probability and is calculated as;
QSSDF =
s∑
i=1
Ps{i}
d∑
i=1
Pd{i},
QSSDF =
s∑
i=1
[(
s
i
)(
N−s
m−i
)(
N
m
) ] d∑
i=1
[(
d
i
)(
N−d
m−i
)(
N
m
) ],
(5.12)
where P{s} =
∑s
i=1 Ps{i} is the probability of compromising s CR nodes, while
P{d} =
∑d
i=1 Pd{i} is the probability of compromising all d trusted CR nodes.
In Figure 5.2, we compare the security strength of the proposed scheme RCSSS
against SSDF attacks with three different strategies. Our main concern here is to
show the effect of the SSDF attacks on the network for different fractions of mali-
cious CR nodes. It is evident that the proposed RCSSS performs better than other
techniques in confronting SSDF attacks. This is due to the efficient verification
process at the FC and the trusted node selection procedure, which makes it very
difficult for the attacker to break the verification process and inject faulty sensory
data. However, COOPON and BAIS find that the probability of spoofing the FC
increases with increasing malicious CR nodes. This is mainly because increasing
the number of malicious nodes will decrease the accuracy of detection in COOPON.
However, for the BAIS strategy, when 50% or more nodes are malicious, the FC
becomes completely blind, i.e., the probability of identifying an SSDF attacker be-
comes zero. It is clear even under a huge proportion of attackers (50%), the RCSSS
performs better than the other schemes in thwarting the SSDF attacks.
5.3.2 Security Strength Regarding End-to-End Data Confi-
dentiality and Integrity
In RCSSS, every report is encrypted using the corresponding cell key. Hence, com-
promising any CR node from a particular cell would not affect the confidentiality
of the generated report. The content of the report is revealed and can be obtained
only by a CR node inside the cell. Hence, the confidentiality of the sensory report is
guaranteed even when a number of nodes outside a particular cell are compromised.
95
5.3 Performance Analysis and Discussion
The adversary may obtain the content of the report only if a CR node participat-
ing in the generation of the corresponding report is compromised. In addition, the
integrity of the sensing report should not be compromised as long as its cell nodes
are not compromised. Therefore, the attacker needs to control s CR nodes of that
particular cell in order to use their unique keys to modify the sensing data and cre-
ate new signatures (SPack) that could pass the FC verification process. Accordingly,
controlling intermediate nodes would not result in multiple gains and does not allow
the adversary to break the confidentiality or the integrity of other cells. Hence,
assume the attacker compromised b nodes from a total of s endorsement nodes. It
is required to compromise (m− b) CR nodes from the remaining (N − s) CR nodes
in the network in order to compromise that particular cell. As s nodes are picked
randomly from N CR nodes in the network, there are
(
N
s
)(
s
b
)(
N−s
m−b
)
different ways
that the attacker could compromise b nodes from s CR nodes that signed the report.
As a result, the probability that an attacker compromises the confidentiality is,
Ps{b} =
[(
N
s
)(
s
b
)(
N−s
m−b
)(
N
m
)(
N
s
) ] = [(sb)(N−sm−b)(
N
m
) ]. (5.13)
Lastly, the adversary needs to compromise k CR nodes from the cells trusted
nodes d, only known by the FC, in order to successfully compromise a particular
cell in terms of integrity,
Pd{b} =
[(
N
d
)(
d
b
)(
N−d
m−b
)(
N
m
)(
N
d
) ] = [(db)(N−dm−b)(
N
m
) ]. (5.14)
Accordingly, in line with Baye’s theorem [117], the probability of a given cell
being secure with respect to data confidentiality and integrity can be calculated as
a conditional probability;
PE2E{s|d} =
[
1−
(
s
b
)(
N−s
m−b
)(
N
m
) ][1− (db)(N−dm−b)(
N
m
) ]. (5.15)
Figure 5.3 shows the performance enhancement achieved by the proposed scheme
with respect to end-to-end security of data confidentiality and integrity. RCSSS sig-
nificantly outperforms other schemes regarding the fraction of secure cells in the
entire network. By adopting the location-aware feature, the impact of the compro-
mised nodes on the entire network can be reduced to their vicinity without affecting
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Figure 5.2: Probability of the network being under SSDF attacks versus the fraction
of malicious CR users in the network
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the system’s end-to-end security in terms of confidential-
ity and integrity
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the end-to-end security of other sensing data. It clearly shows that, as the number of
malicious nodes increases, the performance degradation of all systems also increases.
BAIS performs well only when the number of attackers is less than or equal to 30%
of the total CR nodes. On the other hand, our proposed scheme mitigates the effect
of attackers even with a higher ratio of attackers. The participation of trusted nodes
and the verification process of the FC makes it difficult for the attacker to compro-
mise the security of a particular cell as it needs to control d trusted CR nodes in
addition to s endorsement CR nodes in order to be able to modify the contents of
the sensory data and make it pass the FC verification process.
5.3.3 The Probability of False Alarm and Missed Detection
In this section, we consider the performance of the trusted node selection in terms
of its false alarm probability (QF ) (i.e. a trusted CR node is wrongly identified
as a malicious node) and missed detection probability (QMD) (i.e, a malicious CR
node is wrongly identified as a trusted node). Let Pˆf and Pˆmd denote the average
probability of false alarm and missed detection for any CR node, respectively. We
assume P Tf , P
T
md and P
M
f , P
M
md are the false alarm and missed detection probabilities
for the trusted and the malicious CR nodes, respectively. Based on the analysis
in [118], the probability that a trusted CRi status on the k
th channel, namely CHki ,
is different from the one concluded by the FC (CHkFC) is Q
k
f ,
Qkf = Pr{CHki 6= CHkFC | CRi is a trusted node} (5.16)
=
[
P Tf (1− Pˆf ) + (1− P Tf )Pˆf
]
P kidle
+
[
(1− P Tmd)Pˆmd + P Tmd(1− Pˆmd)
]
P kbusy,
where P kidle is the probability of the k
th channel being idle concluded by the FC,
given as,
P kidle = Pr{CHkFC = idle} =
∑L
j=1CH
k
j
n
. (5.17)
Here, L is the number of reports verified by the FC out of n reports received from
a particular cell.
P kbusy is the probability of the channel k being busy concluded by the FC, given
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as,
P kbusy = Pr{CHkFC = busy} = 1− P kidle, (5.18)
= 1−
(∑L
j=1CH
k
j
n
)
.
Furthermore, we denote by CV ki , the correlation value of channels status between
CRi and the FC, given by [118],
CV ki =
W∑
t=1
| CHki (t)− CHkFC(t) |, (5.19)
where t is the sensing time slot of a collection period W , (t = 1, 2, ...,W ). We assume
all the channels are independent and follow a Bernoulli distribution with identical
probability Qkf . Based on the or-rule, the CR user whose CV goes above a certain
threshold θ is identified as malicious. By assuming these variables are large enough,
the correlation value CV ki can be approximated to be a Gaussian distribution by
using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [119],
CV ki ∼ N
(
WQkf ,WQ
k
f
(
1−Qkf
))
. (5.20)
Hence, with a given θ, the probability of a false alarm for a trusted CR node is,
Qkf = 1− Φ
 θ −WQkf√
WQkf
(
1−Qkf
)
 . (5.21)
Finally, based on the or-rule the probability of a trusted node identified as ma-
licious can be written as follows,
QF = 1−
K∏
k=1
(
1−Qkf
)
. (5.22)
For the or-rule, the FC infers the presence of a malicious node when at least one
local channel measurement does not match with the FC results. It can be seen that
the or-rule is very conservative for the CR nodes to be selected as trusted nodes.
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Similarly, the probability that a malicious CRi status on channel k, namely CH
k
i ,
matching the one concluded by the FC (CHkFC) is Q
k
md,
Qkmd = Pr{CHki = CHkFC | CRi is a malicious node} (5.23)
= 1−
{[
PMf (1− Pˆf ) + (1− PMf )Pˆf
]
P kidle
+
[
(1− PMmd)Pˆmd + PMmd(1− Pˆmd)
]
P kbusy
}
.
Then, by using the CLT, the correlation value CV ki can be approximated to be
a Gaussian distribution,
CV ki ∼ N
(
W
(
1−Qkmd
)
,WQkmd
(
1−Qkmd
))
. (5.24)
Hence, with a given θ, the probability of missed detection for a malicious CR
node is,
Qmd = Φ
 θ −W (1−Qkmd)√
WQkmd
(
1−Qkmd
)
 . (5.25)
Finally, the probability of a malicious node identified as a trusted node can be
written as follows,
QMD =
K∏
k=1
Qkmd. (5.26)
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show the performance of the trusted node selection
strategy. It is clearly demonstrated that both the probability of false alarm QF
and the probability of missed detection QMD are considerably influenced by the
probability of network vulnerability β. In addition, selecting a proper threshold for
the correlation value could enhance the performance of the system. The higher false
alarm probability means that there is a higher probability to misjudge trusted CR
nodes as malicious users. However, the higher missed detection probability means
an increased presence of malicious CR nodes in the trusted list, which will result in
wrong spectrum decisions.
It is worth noting that the performance of the node classification technique is
influenced by the sensing information accuracy. Moreover, the presence of the trust-
worthiness threshold δ could significantly reduce the probability of false alarm (QF )
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Figure 5.4: Probability of a trusted CR node wrongly identified as a malicious node
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Figure 5.5: Probability of a malicious CR node wrongly identified as a trusted node
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Figure 5.6: False alarm probability vs. δ and θ
and missed detection (QMD). This primarily improves the efficiency of the selection
strategy used in picking up the trusted nodes and the classification of CR nodes
as shown in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7. The probability of CR exclusion from the
trusted node list is presented in Figure 5.8. We employ a reputation-based metric
to counter SSDF attacks by excluding those malicious users from the sensing data
fusion process. It can be noticed that the suspension probability of malicious CR
nodes (PExclusionM ) reduces as the density of attackers rises, while the suspension
probability of honest CR nodes (PExclusionH ) increases at the FC. When the network
is under huge attack, the system will not be able to exclude malicious CR nodes
from the list. In addition, it will mistakenly consider honest nodes as attackers. In
this case, the system will not be of any use.
5.3.4 Identification of Malicious Nodes
Figure 5.9 compares the performance of the dynamic reputation update algorithm for
different users. The behaviour of three different users, periodic attacker, intermittent
attacker and honest node is considered. For the periodic attack, when the malicious
node starts attacking (round four), the system reputation quickly decreases. This
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Figure 5.9: The dynamic reputation update process for different behaviours of CR
users
continues as the node sends false sensing information. When the node’s TR goes
below a certain threshold δ, it will be excluded from the list of trusted nodes.
In the case of an occasional attack, the node’s reputation will decrease quickly
by λ2 when providing faulty sensing data, but will increase slowly by λ1 when it
behaves normally. Finally, the honest nodes’ reputation will increase steadily with a
relatively small λ1. It is worth mentioning that adopting different weights λ1 and λ2
in the reputation update algorithm allows us to deal with honest nodes and malicious
nodes in different ways which result in enhancing the system’s performance. The
proposed strategy allows fast exclusion of malicious nodes from the trusted node
list. Although, it tolerates some nodes that occasionally provide wrong sensory
information in order for them to correct their decisions.
5.4 Conclusion
Collaborative spectrum sensing is considered as an efficient strategy to enhance the
accuracy of spectrum sensing in CR networks. However, when some nodes in the
network are corrupted by adversaries, the efficiency of collaborative sensing may be
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reduced considerably. In this chapter, we present a novel defence scheme against
fraudulent spectrum sensing data reported by malicious CR users. Multi-levels of
defence are used to maintain an adequate level of protection. First, we employ a
secure authentication protocol between the FC and the collaborative nodes. Second,
three tiers of verification, the unique signature of the node, the cell-mates signatures
and the seal of the trusted nodes have to be checked by the FC to validate the
received sensory data. Finally, an efficient reputation-based fusion scheme is used
as a third level of defence, enabling the FC to select trusted nodes with the objective
of ensuring the reliability of the received sensory information.
Mathematical analysis and simulation results show that our proposed scheme
performs well against SSDF attacks as well as considerably enhancing the end-to-
end security which enables the decision maker to obtain more reliable and accurate
sensing results in an adversarial environment. The proposed framework is flexible
and can be easily extended to detect various kinds of attacks in addition to SSDF
attacks. The results of this work will help in minimizing the potential security
vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of CR networks.
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Conclusion and Further Research
CR emerges as a revolutionary technology to deal with the disparity between the
continuously increasing demand for wireless radio spectrum and the spectrum un-
derutilization by licensed users. Although the operational aspects of CR networks
have attracted considerable research attention, research on spectrum management
techniques is still in its infancy. In this thesis, three intelligent spectrum manage-
ment techniques for CR networks are addressed: 1) distributed intelligent primary
receiver-aware message exchange in CR ad hoc networks; 2) distributed reliable
broadcasting for CR ad hoc networks; and 3) an efficient protocol to defend particu-
lar network security attacks in CR networks. The issues investigated in this research
have crucial impact on the establishment, functionality, performance and security of
CR networks. Furthermore, many of the unique spectrum management challenges
in CR networks are addressed for the first time in this thesis. These challenges
have vital effects on the network performance and functionality and particularly
difficult to solve due to the unique characteristics of CR networks. The research in
this thesis is fundamental for laying the foundations of CR networks and operating
networking protocols for reliable communications in CR networks. Furthermore, it
provides essential visions for future protocol design in CR networks. This chapter
summarizes the main contributions and highlights the major advances that have
been accomplished. In addition, it sheds light on directions and suggestions for
further research.
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6.1 Conclusion
We started by discussing the broadcast issue and the challenges it brings in CR
ad hoc networks. We then studied and discussed two straightforward broadcasting
schemes. Based on the outcomes of investigating different broadcasting strategies,
we obtain some important insights for designing an efficient and robust broadcasting
protocol for CR ad hoc networks. Additionally, we highlighted the security threats in
CR networks, specifically the SSDF attacks and its effect on the performance of the
CR network. Furthermore, a survey of existing research related to the broadcasting
protocols and the defending schemes against SSDF attacks is provided. The main
contributions presented in this thesis are listed below:
• The control-message exchange challenges in CR ad hoc networks with PU re-
ceivers collision avoidance have been addressed for the first time. The problem
is formulated by investigating the trade-off between maximizing successful CR
broadcast and maximizing PU receiver protection. Two distributed broadcast-
ing algorithms, maximize PU protection (MPUP) and maximize CR connec-
tivity (MCRC) are proposed under practical scenarios where no global network
topology is known and no common control channel is assumed to exist. The
major objective of MPUP is the protection of the primary users, explicitly to
protect PU receivers that are not detected during spectrum sensing. On the
other hand, the priority of MCRC is to increase the packet delivery ratio by
increasing the CR network connectivity. A key novelty of this work is the for-
mulation of the broadcast issue from the viewpoint of protecting PU receivers,
which is a distinctive feature in CR networks. Simulation results show that
our proposed broadcasting schemes achieve higher measure of safeguarding of
PU nodes whilst providing a high successful broadcast ratio. MPUP offers
the best protection for PU communications, particularly PU receivers in the
PU zones. While MCRC achieves a high successful broadcast ratio through
connecting the maximum number of CR nodes.
• An intelligent and fully-distributed broadcasting protocol for reliable data dis-
semination in CR ad hoc networks named CRBP is introduced. The main
design objective of CRBP is to reliably disseminate the control information
through connecting different local topologies, a unique feature in cognitive
107
6.1 Conclusion
radio networks, and to synchronise both transmitter and receiver without a
common control channel. The proposed protocol decomposes a complicated
CR network into a simpler one so that the complexity of the original CR
network can be reduced and an efficient selection of broadcast channels can
be acquired. By jointly mapping the network topologies and the spectrum
observations onto a bipartite graph, CRBP allows each node to capture the
spectrum information and the local topologies of all the neighbouring nodes.
This secures the network connectivity and reduces the interference with pri-
mary users. The reliability is ensured by connecting different topologies and
synchronizing adjacent nodes. A key novelty of the proposed CRBP is the for-
mulation of the broadcast problem from the viewpoint of connecting different
local topologies, which is a unique feature in cognitive radio networks. Simu-
lation results confirm that CRBP outperforms other broadcasting schemes in
terms of reliable data dissemination and network connectivity.
• A malicious type of security threat in CR networks named the spectrum sens-
ing data falsification is investigated. CR nodes corrupted by adversaries inject
false sensory information into the central data collector during the fusion pro-
cess so that the FC may make incorrect sensing decisions about spectrum
availability. Furthermore, an intermediate malicious CR node could manip-
ulate the received message before forwarding it to the FC. This attack is so
difficult to detect and may seriously exacerbate the spectrum access proba-
bility. A novel and robust defence scheme to counter the SSDF attacks in
CR networks is presented. Multi-levels of defence are used to maintain an
adequate level of protection:i) a secure authentication protocol between the
FC and the collaborative nodes is employed; ii) three tiers of verification, the
unique signature of the node, the cell-mates signatures and the seal of the
trusted nodes have to be checked by the FC to validate the received sensory
data; iii) an efficient reputation-based fusion scheme is used as a third level
of defence, which enables the FC to select trusted nodes with the objective
of ensuring the reliability of the received sensory information. Mathematical
analysis and simulation results show that the proposed scheme performs well
against SSDF attacks as well as considerably enhancing the end-to-end secu-
rity which enables the decision maker to obtain more reliable and accurate
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sensing results in an adversarial environment.
6.2 Further Research
In this research, we have investigated some challenges and developed techniques
for spectrum management in CR networks. However, we have only scratched the
surface of this new wireless communication paradigm. There are many research
issues that have not yet been investigated, particularly concerning spectrum man-
agement techniques used to fulfil the expected potential of CR wireless networks.
Some recommendations for further research directions that would build on the work
presented in this thesis are summarised as follows:
• Primary user activity model: We have studied the performance of the pro-
posed broadcasting protocols based on mapping the primary network channel
availability as the PU activity model for MPUP, MCRC and CRBP broad-
casting protocols developed in Chapters 3 and 4. The primary network channel
availability can be represented with different channel activity models, such as
Bernoulli Process, General Distribution and Deterministic Process. It would
be interesting to test and analyse the proposed protocols using different PU
activity models. In fact, PU activity in a real wireless environment is much
more complicated. For a practical scenario, large scale experimental tests need
to be done to provide sold benchmarks for the aforementioned issue.
• Dynamic spectrum access: There are three DSA models: 1) underlay DSA
model, 2) overlay DSA model and 3) interweave DSA model. Throughout this
thesis, we have adopted the interweave DSA model. One potential possible
direction is to extend current work while taking both underlay and overlay
DSA models into account.
• Broadcast latency: Future works on this topic may focus on the investigation
of how multiple CR node have to broadcast data with different priorities. In
addition, we would like to measure the broadcast latency in various interference
environments.
• Distributed decision: One potential improvement to the proposed defence
scheme could be realized by combining the artificial neural network with the
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verification module for knowledge adaptation and fusion, which might be used
to deal with more challenging scenarios in CR ad hoc networks where no cen-
tral entity is available.
• Extending the detecting scheme: Further research is needed to investigate
more effective methods of identifying adversaries and to understand when ma-
licious nodes collude in various groups to increase their goal of degrading the
collaborative spectrum sensing. The proposed framework is flexible and can be
easily extended to detect various kinds of attacks in addition to SSDF attacks.
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